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Abstract. This is a non-standard paper, containing some problems, mainly in
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me, sometimes the problems are presented with a discussion of how I have tried to
solve them, and sometimes with failed tries, anecdote and opinion. So the discussion
is quite personal, in other words, egocentric and somewhat accidental. As we discuss
many problems, history and side references are erratic, usually kept at a minimum
(“See...” means: see the references there and possibly the paper itself).
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Content
Part II
§1 Two cardinal theorems and partition theorems
[n-cardinal theorems (1.11 - 1.17), λ-like for n-Mahlo (1.18), from finite
models (1.19 - 1.22), omitting types and Borel squares and rectangles (1.23
- 1.28), Hanf numbers connected to Lλ+,ω (1.28 - 1.30).]
§2 Monadic Logic and indiscernible sequences
[Monadic logic for linder orders (2.1 - 2.7 + 2.22), classification by unary
expansion (2.8 + 2.17 + 2.21), classifying by existence of indiscernibles and
generalizations, the properties and relatives (k, c) − ∗-stable (2.9 - 2.20),
Borel theory (2.22).]
§3 Automorphisms and quantifiers
[Compact second order quantifiers (3.2 - 3.6). Rigid and strongly rigid
theories, pseudo decomposable theories (3.7 - 3.10), “all automorphisms ex-
tended”, on characterization (3.14) interpreting in the automorphism group
of (free) algebra in a variety (3.14 - 3.15), properties of abstract logics (3.17
- 3.18 + 3.21), second order quantifiers like (aaX)ϕ (3.19, 3.20).]
§4 Relatives of the main gap
[Generally does the main gap characterize theories with models character-
ized by invariants (4.6,4.8 - 4.13); classifying will not die. Variation of the
main gap for stable countable theories (4.1 - 4.3), pseudo elementary classes
(4.5) uncountable theories (4.7).
Minimal models under embeddability (4.15 - 4.17), can forcing make mod-
els isormorphic (4.18 - 4.19), models up to L∞,κ-equivalence and on Karp
height (4.20 - 4.22).]
§5 Classifying unstable theories
[Dividng lines, poor man ZFC-answer (beginning + 5.1,5.2, 5.3, 5.28, 5.35),
SP(T ) and simplicity (5.4), NIP, generalizing universality spectrum. NSOPn
and tree coding (5.11 - 5.14). We look at classifying such properties (5.15
- 5.23; again universality spectrum (5.25 - 5.31, 5.28) about test problems,
NIP (5.36 - 5.40) earlier (5.8).]
§6 Classification theory for non-elementary classes
[We ask about stability for KD (6.1 - 6.6), categoricity for ψ ∈ Lλ+,ω (6.8
- 6.14) classification for such ψ (6.15), Φ (6.16); instead of ψ ∈ Lλ+,ω we
usually deal with a.e.c. (abstract elementary classes).]
§7 Finite model theory
[Finding a logic (7.1), model theoretic content of some 0-1 laws (7.2), looking
for dichotomies (7.4), generalized quantifiers.]
§8 More on finite partition theorems
[Relatives of Halse-Jewett are considered.]
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§1 Two cardinal theorems
During the 1960’s, two cardinal theorems were popular among model theorists.
1.1 Definition. (λ1, . . . , λn) →κ (µ1, . . . , µn) holds if whenever T is a set of κ
f.o. sentences with unary predicates P1, . . . , Pn and every finite subset of T has
a model M such that |PMi | = λi for i = 1, . . . , n, then T has a model N such
that |PNi | = µi for i = 1, . . . , n. If κ is omitted we mean κ = ℵ0. For notational
simplicity we always assume λ1 ≥ . . . ≥ λn, µ1 ≥ . . . ≥ µn.
We shall usually speak on the case n = 2; we have, for general discussion,
ignore the possibility of adding cardinality quantifier (∃≤λx). Later the subject
becomes less popular; Jensen complained “when I start to deal with gap n 2-
cardinal theorems, they were the epitome of model theory and as I finished, it
stopped to be of interest to model theorists”.
I sympathize, though model theorists has reasonable excuses: one is that they want
ZFC-provable theorems or at least semi-ZFC ones (see [Sh 666, 1.20t]) the second
is that it has not been clear if there were any more.
1.2 Question: Are there more nontrivial n-cardinal ZFC theorems, or only assuming
facts on cardinal arithmetic (i.e. semi ZFC ones).
Maybe I better recall the classical ones.
1.3 Theorem. [Vaught] (λ+, λ)→ (ℵ1,ℵ0).
1.4 Theorem. [Chang] µ = µ<µ ⇒ (λ+, λ)→ (µ+, µ).
1.5 Theorem. [Vaught] (iω(λ), λ)→ (µ1, µ2) when µ1 ≥ µ2.
But there were many independence results and positive theorems for V = L (see
[Ho93], [CK], [Sch85], [Sh 18]).
After several years of drawing a blank, I found a short and easy proof of
1.6 Claim. (ℵω,ℵ0)→ (2
ℵ0 ,ℵ0).
In fact (λ+ω , λ)→ (µ1, µ2) if Ded′(µ2) > µ1 ≥ µ2 where
1.7 Definition. Ded′(µ) = Min{λ : if T is a tree with λ nodes and δ ≤ λ levels,
then the number of its δ-branches is < λ}. This is essentially equal to
Ded(µ) = Min
{
λ :if I is a linear order of cardinality µ
then I has < λ Dedekind cuts
}
.
See [Sh 49]. Considering the many independence proofs and natural limitations,
one may ask ([CK])
1.8 Question: Assume λ = λiω(µ) and λ1 = (λ1)
<λ1 ≥ µ, do we have (λ+, λ, µ) →
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(λ+1 , λ1, µ1).
Things are not commutative, if µ = µ<µ then (iω(µ
+), µ+, µ)→ (λ, µ+, µ) is easy
and well known (a consequence of 1.4 + 1.5).
In fact, the impression this becomes set theory has some formal standing: we know
that all such theorems are provably equivalent to suitable partition theorems, for
formalizing this we need the following definition.
1.9 Definition. 1) Let E be an equivalence relation on P(n) preserving cardinal-
ity; we call such a pair (n,E) an identity. Let λ→ (n,E)µ mean that if Fℓ : [λ]ℓ → µ
for ℓ ≤ n, then we can find α0 < . . . < αn−1 < λ such that for any u, v ∈ [n]
k, k ≤ n
we have:
uEv ⇒ Fk(. . . , αℓ, . . . )ℓ∈u = Fk(. . . , αℓ, . . . )ℓ∈v
we call (n,E) an identity of (λ, µ).
2) Id(λ, µ) =: {(n,E) : (n,E) is an identity of (λ, µ)}.
Now
1.10 Claim. Essentially assuming λ > µ, λ1 ≥ µ1 ≥ κ we have: (λ, µ)→κ (λ1, µ1)
iff Id(λ, µ) ⊇ Id(λ1, µ1) (see [Sh 8], [Sh:E17]).
Fully: if µ1 = µ
ℵ0 or just (λ1, µ1) →ℵ0 (λ1, µ1) then the equivalence holds; the
implication ⇒ holds always.
This leaves open:
1.11 Question: Prove the consistency of the existence of λ ≥ µ such that (λ, µ) 9
(λ, µ) (another formulation is: (λ, µ) is not ℵ0-compact).
1.12 Discussion: I am sure that the statement in 1.11 is consistent. Note that all
the cases we mention gives the ℵ0-compactness (and a completeness theorem).
Originally the theorems quoted above were not proved in this way.
Vaught proved 1.3 by (sequence)-homogeneous models. Chang proved 1.4 by
saturated models of suitable expansion of T .
Vaught 1.5 finds a consistent expansion T1 of T which has a built-in elementary
extension increasing P1 but preserving P2. Morley used Erdo¨s Rado theorem to
give an alternative proof. Now (ℵω,ℵ0) → (2ℵ0 ,ℵ0) was proved this way. It took
me some effort to characterize the identities for the pair (ℵ1,ℵ0), see [Sh 74], so it
gives an alternate proof.
Surely Jensen’s proof of his 2-cardinal theorems can be analyzed in this way, but I
have not looked at this.
Now Jensen’s proofs in this light, say
1.13 Theorem. 1) Fixing n, if we look at what can be Id(λ+n, λ), when V = L,
it is minimal.
2) If V = L, then Id(µ+, µ), µ singular, (e.g. Id(ℵω+1,ℵω)) is equal to Id(ℵ1,ℵ0)
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hence is minimal.
This fits the intuition that L tends to have objects. So there are many colorings in
this case.
So we can ask
1.14 Question: Fixing a pattern of cardinal arithmetic, what is the minimal pos-
sible set Id(λ, µ) if it exists? (Minimal: varying on forcing extensions giving
such patterns). As equivalent formulation is: what identities are provable? E.g.
µ = µ<µ, 2µ = µ++, λ = µ+3 = 2µ
+
.
The idea is: if we lose hope that all such pairs have the same set of identities,
resolvable in ZFC, can we at least find minimal pairs. We may instead of cardinal
arithmetic use e.g. “there is a kurepa tree” or whatever, but this is less appealing
to me.
It is natural to ask also:
1.15 Question: Fixing a pattern of cardinal arithemtic, what is the maximal possible
for set Id(λ, µ)?
A very natural case is λ = in(µ), n ≥ 2. In fact, I think it is almost sure that the
following case gives it. Let λ0 > λ1 > . . . > λn, with each λℓ is supercompact Laver
indestructible, now force by
∏
ℓ<n
Pℓ where Pℓ is adding λℓ+1 Cohens subsets of λℓ. I
think (λn, λ0) in this model has a maximal set of identities. The point is that each
λℓ+1 satisfies a generalization of Halpern-Lauchli theorem (see [Sh 288, §4]).
1.16 Question: Assume GCH, µ singular limit of supercompacts. Is Id(µ+, µ)
maximal?
Jensen had found the minimal 1.2; now see [MgSh 324], there is no µ+-tree for µ
as above, so it is a natural candidate for maximality.
1.17 Question: 1) What is the maximal set of identities Id(λ+n, λ) under GCH?
2) Can we have a universe of set theory satisfying GCH +
∧
λ
Id(λ+n, λ) maximal?
3) Similarly for (in(λ), λ)).
For (2),(3) we need “GCH fails everywhere (badly)”, see Foreman Woodin [FW].
Generally, our knowledge on the family of forcing doing something for all cardinals
seems not to be developed flexibly enough now (see [Sh 666]).
1.18 Question: 1) If λ is strongly inaccessible cardinal and λ1 is an inaccessible
non-Mahlo cardinal which has a square (or even V = L) and the first order ψ has
a λ-like model then ψ has a λ-like model?
2) Similarly with λ being n-Mahlo, λ1 being not (n + 1)-Mahlo (and V = L) (see
[Sch85]).
We know it is surely true (at least if V = L), but this is not a proof. The singular
case is Keisler [Ke68] (and more in [Sh 18]).
∗ ∗ ∗
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We can ask
1.19 Problem: When do we have κ ∈ {2,ℵ0} and {(mi,1, . . . ,mi,n) : i < ω} →κ
(µ1, . . . , µn) with mi,ℓ < ω which means:
(∗) if T is first order theory of cardinality ≤ κ and every finite T ′ ⊆ T for i
large enough have a model Mi such that |P
Mi
ℓ | = mi,ℓ for ℓ = 1, . . . , n, then
T has a model M, |PMℓ | = µℓ for ℓ = 1, . . . , n.
We know something, see [Sh 37], [Sh 18, p.250-1]. (We ignore here the
can of disjunctions; for every i large enough for some j, T ′ has a model
M, |PMℓ | = mi,j,ℓ).
1.20 Claim. : If i ≤ mi,1 and (mi,1)i ≤ mi,2 then
{(mi1,m
i
2) : i < ω} → (ℵ0, 2
ℵ0).
1.21 Question: Formi,1,mi,2 as in 1.20 do we have always (i.e. for every λ, provably
in ZFC) {(mi1,m
i
2) : i < ω} → (2
λ, λ)? Or at least {(2m,m) : m < ω} → (2λ, λ).
(The problem is when Ded(λ) < (2λ)+). Those problems (1.19 - 1.22) are involved
with problems in (finitary) Ramsey theory. Natural (and enough) to try to show
consistency of (for T with Skolem functions)
TSk ∪ {xη 6= xν & P1(xη) : η ∈
λ2, η 6= ν ∈ λ2}
∪ {P2(σ(xη1 , . . . , xηn))→ σ(xη1 , . . . , xηn) = σ(xν1 , . . . , xνn) :
n < ω, σ a term and 〈η1, . . . , ηn〉 ≈ 〈ν1, . . . , νn〉}
where 〈η0, . . . , ηn−1〉 ≈ 〈ν0, . . . , νn−1〉, for ηℓ, νℓ ∈ λ2, means
(∗)(a) ηℓ <lex ηk ≡ νℓ <lex νk, of course <ℓex is lexicographic order
(b) ℓg(ηℓ1 ∩ ηk1) < ℓg(ηℓ2 ∩ ηk2)⇔ ℓg(νℓ1 ∩ νk1) < ℓg(νℓ2 ∩ νk2)
(c) ηm(ℓg(ηℓ ∩ ηk)) = νm(ℓg(νℓ ∩ νk)).
(Main Point: level of the splitting not important, unlike the proof of the previous
theorem 1.20).
This approach tells us to find more identities for the relevant finite pairs. We can,
on the other hand, try to exploit that “Id(2λ, λ) is smaller than suggested by the
above approach” (see [Sh 430, 3.4,6.3]).
1.22 Question: Does, for W ⊆ ω infinite, n < ω
{(in(i), i) : i ∈W} → (in(λ), λ)?
or even
{
(
(in(i))
i, i
)
: i ∈ W} → (in+1(λ), λ)?
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Some of the theorems above have also parallel with omitting types. So considering
some parallelism it is very natural to ask
1.23 Question: If ψ ∈ Lω1,ω has a model of cardinality ≥ ℵω1 does it have a model
of cardinality continuum? (well assuming 2ℵ0 > ℵω1).
This is connected to the problem of Borel squares, a problem I had heard from
Harrington about.
1.24 Definition. 1) A set B ⊆ ω2× ω2 contains a λ-square if for some A ⊆ ω2 of
cardinality λ we have A×A ⊆ B i.e. η, ν ∈ A⇒ (η, ν) ∈ B.
2) A set B ⊆ ω2 × ω2 contains a perfect square if there is a perfect set P ⊆ ω2
such that P ×P ⊆ B.
3) A set B ⊆ ω2× ω2 contains a λ-rectangle if for some A1, A2 ⊆ ω2 of cardinality
λ we have A1 ×A2 ⊆ B. We add perfect if A1, A2 are perfect.
The connection is (see [Sh 522]).
1.25 Claim. Assume MA+ 2ℵ0 > ℵω1 , for some cardinal λ
∗ we have
(a)1 if ψ ∈ Lω1,ω has a model of cardinality ≥ λ
∗ then it has a model of cardi-
nality continuum
(a)2 for no λ
′ < λ∗ does (a)1 hold
(b)1 if λ
∗ < 2ℵ0 and B is a Borel subset of ω2× ω2 and it has a λ∗-square, then
B contains a perfect set
(b)2 for no λ
′ < λ∗ does (b)1 hold
(c) if λ∗ < 2ℵ0 then λ∗ is a limit cardinal of cofinality ℵ1.
In fact this λ∗ essentially can be defined as λℵ1 (ℵ0) where
1.26 Definition. 1) For a model M with countable vocabulary, we define
rkµ : {w ⊆M : w finite nonempty} → Ord ∪ {∞}
(really rkM,µ) by
rkµ(w) ≥ α+ 1 iff, for any enumeration 〈aℓ : ℓ < |w|〉 of w
and first order formula ϕ(x0, x1, . . . , xn−1) ∈ Lτ(M) such that
M |= ϕ[a0, a1, . . . , an−1] we can find ≥ µ members
a′0 ∈M\{a0} such that
M |= ϕ[a′0, a1, a2, . . . , an−1] and rk(w ∪ {a
′
0}) ≥ α.
2) λµ,α(ℵ0) = Min{λ : if M is a model of cardinality λ and countable vocabulary
then α ≤ sup{rkµ(w) + 1 : w ⊆M finite nonempty}. We may omit µ if µ = 1.
So question 1.23 can be rephrased as
1.27 Question: If λω1(ℵ0) = ℵω1?
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It is harder but we can deal similarly with rectangles and with equivalence rela-
tions (see [Sh 522] and hopefully [Sh 532]); so e.g.
1.28 Question: If a Borel set B ⊆ ω2 × ω2 contains an e.g. ℵω1-rectangle (i.e. a
A1 ×A2, |A1| = |A2| = ℵω1) then does it contain a perfect rectangle?
∗ ∗ ∗
On Hanf numbers of omitting types and relatives see Grossberg Shelah [GrSh 259].
Let δ2(λ, κ) be the minimal ordinal δ such that if ψ ∈ Lκ+,ω has a model M ,
otp(M,<M ) ≥ δ, |PM | = λ, then ψ has a non-well ordered model N such that
N ↾ PN ≺M ↾ PM .
1.29 Question: If λ > 2κ, cf(κ) ≥ ℵ0 do we have δ2(λ, κ) = (cov(λ, κ) + 2
κ)+?
1.30 Question: Let cf(κ) > ℵ0; is δ2(κ, κ) < (sup{rkD(f) : D an ℵ1-complete filter
on κ, f ∈ κκ})+?
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§2 Monadic Logic and Indiscernible
On monadic logic generally see Gurevich [G] (till ’81).
We almost know how complicated the monadic theory of the real line is: of
course, it is interpretable in the 2nd order theory of 2ℵ0 , while we can interpret
in it the second order theory of 2ℵ0 in V Cohen (Boolean interpretation - probably
the reason it (the undecidability of the monadic theory of (R, <)) was difficult is
that first order interpretation was expected; but it takes more years to see that
this speaks on forcing. We cannot represent syntactically N, but we can represent
Cohen names of natural numbers), see latest version [Sh 284a].
2.1 Question: 1) Can we
(a) interpret the monadic theory of (the order) R in (second order theory of
2ℵ0)V
Cohen
?
or just show
(b) Turing degree(monadic theory of R) ≤ Turing degree(second order theory
of 2ℵ0)V
Cohen
?
There are many variants.
2.2 Definition. 1) For a logic L , ThL (M), the L -theory of the structure M in
the universe V is {ϕ : ϕ ∈ L in the vocabulary of M and in V we have M |= ϕ}.
2) When L is a logic, L (Qt)t∈I means we add the quantifiers Qt,Lλ,κ means we
allow (forming the formulas) take conjunctions on < λ formulas and use a string
of < κ quantifiers. But we may use L = Lω,ω for first order, so Lλ,κ, L(Qt) for the
expansions as above.
You may ask:
2.3 Question: How are the L(2nd)-th theory of 2ℵ0 in V and in V Cohen related? Of
course, 2-nd stand for the quantifier on say arbitrary binary relations.
This is a different question - how many times are they equal, e.g. if V = V Cohen0 ,
then they are equal.
From the point of view of monadic logic, the question I think is: can we “eliminate
quantifiers” using names, and the answer “they are equal” to the second question
(2.1(b)) may be accidental, in the sense that does not answer “can monadic formulas
say more than the appropriate forcing statements”. (They may be one definable
from the other...)
We may also ask, (more specifically than in 2.3)
2.4 Question: Can the monadic theory of R be changed by adding Cohen? What
if we assume V = L?
As indicated, the hope is a “meaningful” reduction of monadic formulas to rele-
vant forcing statement. If we try for other direction, it is natural to try to interpret
the second order theory of 2ℵ0 in V Q for Q another forcing, e.g. Sacks forcing.
It is reasonable to try to deal with a similar problem where the upper and lower
bounds are further apart. Consider Mλ = (
ω>λ, ⊳) in the logic L(Qpr), where Qpr
is the quantifier over pressing down unary function f , where pressing down means
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“f(x) is an initial segment of x”.
Alternatively, ask on the monadic theory of
Mλ = (
ω>λ, ⊳,+,×)
⊳ = {(η, ν) : η an initial segment of ν both in ω>λ}
+ = {(η, ν, ρ) : η ⊳ ρ, ν ⊳ ρ, all three in ω>λ and ℓg(η) + ℓg(ν) = ℓg(ρ)}
× = {(η, ν, ρ) : η, ν, ρ belongs to
{η∗ ↾ n : n < ω} for some η∗ ∈ ωλ and
ℓg(η)× ℓg(ν) = ℓg(ρ)}
Now (see [Sh 205])
2.5 Theorem. In the L(Qpr)-theory of Mλ, we can interpret the Levy(ℵ0, λ)-
Boolean valued second order theory of λ = second order theory of ℵ0 in V Levy(ℵ0,λ).
So the complexity of the L(Qpr)-theory of Mλ is at most that of the second order
theory of λ and at least that of the second order theory of λ in V Levy(ℵ0,λ).
(Note: this is just second order theory of ℵ0 which stabilize under large cardinals).
This depends on λ because in second order theory λV
Levy(ℵ0,λ)
we can e.g. interpret
f.o. theory of (Lλ+ ,∈). So not unnatural to assume that the same is true on
the L(Qpr)-theory of Mλ, this is true, e.g. if ThL(Qpr)(Mλ) is interpretable in the
Levy(ℵ0, λ)-Boolean valued second order theory of λ, that is ℵ0.
2.6 Problem: The parallel of 2.1(b), 2.5 for L(Qpr).
We know that the monadic theory of linear order is complicated, exactly as
second order theory (so they have the same Lowenheim number). Is there a sizable
class where we can have simple monadic theory?
2.7 Problem: Can the monadic theory of well orders be decidable? And/or has a
small Lowenheim number? Even ℵω?
(Why “can” not “is”? Consistently monadic theory of (ω2, <) is as complicated
as you like ([GMSh 141], [LeSh 411]). Note that the statement “every stationary
S ⊆ S20 reflect” can be expressed in monadic logic on (ω2, <), hence the theory
is “set theoretically sensitive”. There are theorems saying that there is a strong
connection.)
There is a natural candidate for such a model of set theory, but it is not known if
it works. The consequence will be that also the Lowenheim number of well ordering
and the Lowenheim numbers of the class of linear orders are small.
The candidate we mention is: let V0 satisfies GCH, we shall force with P∞ =⋃
α
Pα where we use an iterated forcing 〈Pα, Q
˜
α : α an ordinal 〉 with full support
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with Q
˜
i defined as Q
λi in V = VPi , λi = the ith regular uncountable cardinal in
V0, defined as below. In universe V with a cardinal λ = λ
<λ, let Qλ be the result
of iteration of length λ+, 〈Qλ,i, R
˜
λ,i : i < λ
+〉, Qλ =
⋃
i<λ+
Qλ,i, Rλ,i has cardinality
λ and has an extra partial order ≤pr=≤
Rλ,i
pr such that p ≤r q ⇒ p < q and if δ < λ
+
is limit, 〈pi : i < δ〉 is ≤
Rλ,i
pr -increasing continuous then it has a ≤pr-lub and for
every dense open I ⊆ Rλ,i and p ∈ Rλ,i there is q satisfying p ≤
Rλ,i
pr q ∈ I . This
forcing is easy to handle and add e.g. many non reflecting stationary sets (e.g. use
for regular λ > ℵ0, R = {h : h is a function from some αh < λ to h−1{1} do not
reflect}, h1 ≤ h2 ⇔ h1 ⊆ h2 and h1 ≤pr h2 ⇔ h1 = h2 ∨ (h1 ⊆ h2 & h2(αh1) = 0).
The analysis of the monadic theory I expect uses the lemmas (and notions) of
[Sh 42, §4].
∗ ∗ ∗
Suppose we fix a first order theory T (e.g. countable), look at monadic logic on its
class of models. There was much research on the monadic theory of linear orders
and trees. Why? Just accident? (see Baldwin Shelah [BlSh 156]).
2.8 Problem: Let T be first order complete. If we cannot (f.o.) interpret second
order theory in the monadic theory of model of T , then models of T are not much
more complicated than trees.
Note: if in some model M of T expanded by unary predicates call it M+, we
can interpret a one to one function H : A × B → 2 where A,B are infinite, then
the theory is at least as complicated as second order logic, so those are hopelessly
complicated for the purpose of our present investigation. Assume not, that is
(∗) for any M+, ThL(M
+) does not have the independence property.
So we feel the cut is meaningful, a dividing line. We shall return to this later (2.17)
because this connects somehow to another problem also on classifying f.o. theories
suggested by Grossberg and Shelah (observing (∗) below):
2.9 Problem: Investigate →T according to properties of T , where T is a complete
first order theory, where
2.10 Definition. 1) Let λ→T (µ)κ mean that: if M |= T,A ∈ [M ]κ, a¯i ∈ kM for
i < λ, then for some Y ⊆ λ, |Y | = µ, the sequence 〈a¯i : i ∈ Y 〉 is indiscernible over
A in M .
2) Let λ →locT (µ)κ mean that for any finite set ∆ of formulas, we get above ∆-
indiscernibility.
3) We may replace T by K for a class of models, or by M if K = {M}.
2.11 Definition. T has the ω-independence property if there are k < ω and
formula ϕn(x¯1, . . . , x¯n, y¯n) for n < ω where ℓg(x¯i) = k such that for every λ and
F : [λ]<ℵ0 → 2 there are M |= T, a¯i ∈
kM and b¯n ∈
ℓg(y¯n)M such that: M |=
ϕn(a¯i0 , . . . , a¯in−1 , b¯n) iff F ({i0, . . . , in−1}) = 1 (see [LwSh 560]).
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So
(∗) for T with the ω-independence property λ →T (µ)ℵ0 is equivalent to λ →
(µ)<ωℵ0 so they are maximally complicated under this test.
2.12 Problem: If T doesn’t have the independence property (= have NIP), →T is
“nice” because supposedly the prototypes of the class of unstable theories having
NIP is linear order, for which →T has a nice theory (as we can go down to well
ordering).
We expect a nice solution. The problem (2.9) may be partially resolved by an
answer to 5.38. Though the last two problems remain open, we can use a weak
answer to the last to give some information on the earlier one.
2.13 Definition. 1) Let λ →T,m (µ)κ be defined as in 2.10 restricting ourselves
to k such that k < 1 +m (so for m = ω we get 2.10).
2) Let λ →locT,m (µ)κ means that for any finite set ∆ of formulas, we get above
∆-indiscernibility.
Well 2.13(2) is, of course, interesting only when the Erdo¨s-Rado Theorem does
not give the answer. Now you may ask: will it make a difference to demand k = 1.
Surprisingly there is: it suffices to have “no ϕ(x, y; z¯) has the order property in M”
to get strong results on →M (see [Sh 300, Ch.I,§4]). More elaborately, the surprise
for me was that the condition like “no ϕ(x¯, y¯; z¯) has the order property” when
restricting ℓg(x¯) = ℓg(y¯) = k but not ℓg(z¯) has any consequences (some readers
missed the point that the model was not required to be stable), even T was not
required to be stable, but it is less interesting ([Sh 715, np1.11t]).
2.14 Definition. 1) We say T is (k, r) − ∗-NIP if every formula ϕ = ϕ(x¯, y¯, z¯)
with ℓg(x¯) = k, ℓg(y¯) = r is (k, r) − ∗-NIP which means that: for no a¯u, b¯ℓ, c¯ for
u ⊆ ω, ℓ < ω do we have C |= ϕ[a¯u, b¯k, c¯] iff ℓ ∈ u (so ℓg(a¯ℓ) = k, ℓg(b¯k) = r, can be
phrase by a variant of |Skϕ(A)| small). We may replace (ℓ,m) by a set of such pairs.
2) Similarly for other “straight” properties, see 5.15, particularly part (4), 5.16,
5.19.
Note that we have considered ϕ(x¯, y¯, z¯) as the quadruple 〈ϕ, x¯, y¯, z¯〉 with x¯ˆy¯ˆz¯
a sequence with no repetitions of variables, including every variable which occurs
freely in ϕ.
On the relationships of those properties, the independence property and the strict
order property see [Sh 715].
2.15 Problem: Is there a reasonable theory for the family of (k,m) − ∗-NIP first
order theories (complete) T ? Or for the family of first order T without the ω-
independence property? Certainly this is hopeful.
A “theory” here means say as in [Sh:c] for the class of superstable (complete first
order theories) T .
2.16 Question: 1) Prove that for any k < ω, for some ℓ,m (in fact, quite low) we
hope that any complete first order T we have: T is (ℓ,m) − ∗-non-independence,
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iff λ →T,k (µ)χ under reasonable conditions on λ, µ, χ, |T | as in the Erdo¨s Rado
Theorem (rather than large cardinals). You may use a set of (ℓ,m)’s.
2) For k = ω we similarly consider the failure of the ω-independence property. This
will prove that the ω-independence property is a real dividing line for 2.9, but I
have no reasonable speculations on what a theory for this property will say.
What we can get (see [Sh 197])
2.17 Theorem. If every monadic expansion of T does not have the independence
property, then
iω(κ+ |T |)
+ →T (κ
+)κ
(the property in the assumption is very strong, but it is reasonable in context of
“why the research on monadic logic concentrates on trees + linear orders”? How
is this proved? We can decompose any model to a tree sum starting by 2.17 with
a large sequence of indiscernible, extend it to a decomposition, so the tree has 2
levels. However, the cardinality of the “leaves” have no apriori upper bound. But
as there are many leaves such that the model is their sum we can show that the
model, if it is not too little can be extended to all larger cardinalities retaining its
monadic theory.
This proves that the dividing line (mentioned in 2.17 and discussed earlier) is
real.
Macintyre had said that cardinals appearing in a theorem make it uninteresting
(though he has moderate lately). I think inversely and find fascinating theorems
showing that for the family of models of T of cardinality λ having a property is
equivalent to an inside “syntactical” property of T . Also, I think it is a good
way of discovering a worthwhile property of T which should be persuasive even for
those who unlike myself do not see their beauty. Macintyre supposedly is even less
friendly toward infinitary logics; but
2.18 Thesis We use infinitary logic to “drown the noise”; only from the distance you
see the major outlines of the landscape clearly, so for many purposes; e.g. examining
the L∞,κ-theory of models of T will give a more coherent and interesting picture
whereas probably L∞,ℵ0-theory gives an opaque one. It probably is not accidental
that superstability was discovered looking at behaviour in cardinals like iω and not
from investigating countable models.
We may consider more complicated partition relations
2.19 Definition. 1) Let λ →T (µ)nκ for first order complete T means; letting
C = CT , the monster model for T :
⊠ if a¯u ∈ κ>C for u ∈ [λ]≤n, then we can find W ∈ [λ]µ and b¯u ∈ κ>C for
u ∈ [W ]≤n such that:
(α) a¯u is an initial segment of b¯u
(β) v ⊆ u ∈ [W ]≤n ⇒ Rang(b¯v) ⊆ Rang(b¯u)
(γ) if m < ω and i0 < . . . < im−1 and j0 < . . . < jm−1 from W then there
is a C-elementary mapping f (even an automorphism of C) such that:
v ∈ [{0, . . . ,m − 1}]≤n & u1 = {iℓ : ℓ ∈ v} & u2 = {jℓ : ℓ ∈ v}
implies that f maps b¯u1 to b¯u2 .
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2) Similarly for →K ,→M .
In [Sh:h, Ch.VI] we get that for stable T , no large cardinal is needed: cardinal
bounds which is essentially (in(µ
−))+ suffice (in fact this is done in a much more
general framework, and also for trees (ω>λ).
2.20 Problem: For first order theories T for every µ, κ how large is Min{λ : λ →T
(µ)nκ}?
We expect a dichotomy: either suitable large cardinal are needed, so ik(µ+ κ+
|T |) for k = kn large enough suffice.
∗ ∗ ∗
Returning to classifying first order theories T by the monadic logic, the case of T
stable is reasonably analyzed ([BlSh 156], [Sh 284c]), still there is a troublesome
dividing line.
2.21 Problem Assume any model of T is a non-forking sum of 〈Mη : η ∈ T〉 where
T ⊆ ω>λ (closed under initial segments). In some cases the L (mon)-theory is
essentially exactly as complicated as that of (ω>λ, ⊳), in other cases we can interpret
Qpr. Can we prove the dichotomy, i.e. that always at least one of those holds.
Probably not so characteristic of me, but I asked
2.22 Question: Is the monadic-Borel theory of the real line decidable?
2) Is the monadic theory of (ω≥2, ⊳) undecidable?
The meaning of monadic-Borel is that we interpret the monadic quantifier (∃X)ϕ
by “there is a Borel set X” such that ϕ.
The choice of Borel is just a family of subsets of R (or ω≥2) which is closed
under reasonable operations and do not contain subsets gotten by diagonalization
on the continuum. So P(R)∩L[R] assuming AD is okay, too. If we try the (ω≥2, ⊳)
version, Borel determinacy + Rabin machines looks the obvious choice for trying
to prove a decidability answer. For (R, <) it is reasonable to try to get elimination
of quantifiers, i.e. an appropriate version of UThn(R, Q¯) should be enough ([Sh 42,
§4]).
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§3 Automorphisms and quantifiers
3.1 Discussion: As known for long: for first order complete theory T there are lots
of models with lots of automorphisms (in the direction of saturated ones or EM
ones). To build models with no nontrivial ones is hard (even in special cases - there
is literature). Ehrenfeucht conjectures that the classes
{λ : ψ has a rigid model in λ, λ > ℵ0}
are simple (like omitting types, in particular: initial segments); “unfortunately”,
essentially any
∑1
2 class of cardinals may occur (see [Sh 56]). So set theoretically
we understand what these families of cardinals are, but model theoretically the
answer is considered negative. We may try to change the question, so that we can
say something interesting.
3.2 Definition. Let ψ = ψ(R¯) be a first order sentence on the finite sequence R¯ of
predicates and function symbols (with R0, i.e. {x¯0 : R0(x¯0)} being “the universe”,
so unambiguous and for simplicity each Rℓ a predicate; in general x¯
0 is not a
singleton, and we may let R1 be equality). Consider enriching first order logic by
quantifiers Qψ = Qautψ which means that we can apply (Q
ψ
ϕ¯f) to a formula where
ϕ¯ = 〈ϕℓ(x¯
ℓ, z¯) : ℓ < ℓg(R¯)〉, ℓg(x¯ℓ) = arity of Rℓ, and in the inductive definition of
satisfaction M |= (Qψϕ¯,a¯f)ϑ holds when: if 〈ϕi(x¯
ℓ, a¯) : ℓ < ℓg(R¯)〉 defines in M an
R¯-model Mϕ¯,a¯ of ψ then there is an automorphism f of Mϕ¯,a¯ such that ϑ holds.
So syntactically f is a variable on partial unary functions.
Note: those quantifiers ([Sh 43],[Sh:e]; really more general there, see 3.20) do not
exactly fit “Lindstrom quantifiers”. They can be expressed artificially by having
many Lindstrom quantifiers and each Lindstrom quantifier is a case of this. But
those are naturally second order quantifiers and e.g. adding two such quantifiers is
more than adding the cases for each. So for a vocabulary τ in the language
Lω,ω(Q
ψ)(τ)
we have variables: individual variables and unary partial function variables, we
can form (Qψ
〈ψℓ:ℓ<ℓg(R¯)〉y¯
)ϑ if ϕℓ, ϑ are already in Lω,ω(Q
ψ)(τ) and satisfaction is
defined as above. We may allow such quantifier to act only on models Mϕ¯,a¯ whose
universe is ⊆M or to allow the set of elements of Mϕ¯,a¯ (equivalently x¯0) to be e.g.
the set automorphisms of Mϕ∗,b¯∗ for any b¯
∗ satisfying say θ∗(y¯, c) where ψ∗, ϑ∗ are
formulas in our logic of smaller depth, etc. For compactness this does not matter.
3.3 Problem: For which ψ is L(Qψ) a compact logic?
3.4 Example: If R¯ = 〈R0〉, ψ = ∀xR0(x), then we have quantifications on unary
functions varying on permutations, so the quantifier Qψ gives second order logic
(on nontrivial structures). So in this problem even though the models of ψ can be
written as M0 +M1 or “degenerated”, we get second order logic.
Note: So for this classification a sentence ψ which says “the model (of ψ) is trivial”
gives a complicated logic Lω,ω(Q
ψ).
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If ψ has only finite models, the logic is compact in a dull way. You may wonder
if compactness holds for any sentence ψ at all, as this looks like a second order
logic. However, there are interesting sentences ψ with L(Qψ) compact:
(a) ψ = the axiom of the theory of Boolean Algebras, (i.e. conjunction of the
axioms in standard axiomatization)
(b) the axiom of the theory of ordered fields.
We expect that if the models of ψ are complicated enough, the logic will be compact.
We may also have applications to the compactness: it was known
CON(there is 1-homogenous1 atomless Boolean Algebra B
such that Aut(B) is not simple)
even: Con(∃G ⊳ Aut(B)(Aut(B)/G commutative))
(see [Sh 384]; it was known that Aut(B)′ (= commutator subgroup) is simple).
So the compactness and completeness theorems show: ZFC ⊢ “there are such
Boolean Algebras”. So considering the success of the compactness and complete-
ness theorems having such quantifier will be plausably in addition to being good
by itself, also applicable.
So we are interested in:
3.5 Problem: Find more such quantifiers (homomorphisms of embeddings instead
of automorphisms are welcomed, see [Sh:e] on the cases above).
The proof gives more examples but we like to have:
3.6 Problem: Characterize the ψ for which we have a compact L(Qψ) or at least
find:
(a) general criterion
(b) natural examples rather than those which look to the proofs one has.
We may consider also:
3.7 Problem: Characterize the strongly rigid first order theory T and the rigid ones
where,
3.8 Definition. 1) First order T is called strongly rigid if: for every theory T1 ⊇ T
there is a theory T2 ⊇ T1 such that the pair (T2, T ) is rigid which means that T2
has a model M2, such that every f ∈ Aut(M2 ↾ τ(T )) is first order definable with
parameters inM2. We say T is super rigid if above T2 = T1. We say T is essentially
rigid if (T, T ) is rigid. We say (T1, T ) is rigid for ϕ(M) if ϕ(−) is a property of
models of T1 and M2 ↾ τ(T ) satisfies ϕ (e.g. |T1|+-saturated). We add “in λ” if the
models is required to be of cardinality λ.
2) We add the adjective everywhere if we omit the demand “T ⊆ T1” and replace
f ∈ Aut(M2 ↾ τT ) by f an automorphism M of T which is interpreted in M2 by
(first order) formulas with parameters (as in 3.2, of course the model M ′ of T has
the vocabulary of T ).
1A Boolean Algebra B is 1-homogeneous if for any x, y ∈ B\{0B , 1B}, some automorphism of
B map x to y
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This is a way to classify T ’s.
Those are relatives of having rigid models. The definable automorphisms are
the parallel of inner automorphisms of a group. Note that all those notions do not
imply that T has a rigid model; if M is a complete, say infinite, non-abelian group
(i.e. any automorphism is inner) then Th(M) is essentially rigid but has no rigid
model. The version with T1 = T2 is the best case. If we replace T by any model of T
interpretable inM1 (as in 3.8(2)) and allow T1 to have parallels of Skolem functions
we are approximating the compactness and completeness problem discuss above.
We may even let T1 = Th(H (χ),∈), χ strong limit, and consider interpretation of
T on “sets” of the model M2 of T2 rather than classes.
Why have we concentrated on ordered fields and Boolean Algebras?
The point is that e.g. for a dense partial order we can get a model where for
every partial order definable in it, every automorphism of it as a partial order is,
for a dense set of intervals, definable with parameters. (If the partial order is not
dense, consider “infinite intervals”). Why “ordered field”? Only as in this case there
any automorphism is determined by its action on any interval. Concerning Boolean
Algebras, the underpinning point is that we consider structures (A,B,R), R ⊆ A×B
which satisfy comprehension, that is:
(∀y1 6= y2 ∈ B)(∃x ∈ A)(xRy1 ≡ xRy2)
and have the strong independence, that is,
(∀x1, . . . ,xn ∈ A)(∀y1, . . . , yn ∈ A)(∃z)
(
∧
ℓ,k
xℓ 6= yk ⇒ (
n∧
i=1
xiRz & ¬yiRz)).
(An abvious exampls is an atomic Boolean Algebra B,A = atoms(B), B = B are
okay).
For some of the readers a bell may ring. A theory T is unstable: iff it has the strict
order property (that is some ϕ(x¯, y¯) is a partial order with infinite chains) or has
the independence property (a relative of the strong independence property). This
does not say any unstable theory will do but indicates that an unstable theory at
least locally will do.
Note: For the theory of linear orders, for (A,<), if E is a convex equivalence
relation with classes Ai for i < i
∗ and fi ∈ Aut(A,<) maps Ai to itself, then⋃
i
(fi ↾ Ai) ∈ Aut(A,<). (We can express that informally as “models of T are, in
general, decomposable”; to avoid trivialities we restrict ourselves to uncountables
ones). So for T any theory of infinite linear orders, T is not strongly rigid. We need
ψ (or T ) to say that the model is not decomposable.
Generally,
3.9 Definition. 1) We say ψ (or T ) is pseudo decomposable when: if for every n,
there are a model M of ψ (or of T ), M the disjoint union of the nonempty sets Ai
(for i < n) and f1i 6= f
2
i from Aut(M) such that
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f1i ↾ (M\Ai) = f
2
i ↾ (M\Ai)
and
n−1⋃
i=0
(f
η(i)
i ↾ Ai) ∈ Aut(M) for every η ∈
n2; in other words,M has a nontrivial
automorphism over M\Ai for each i.
2) We say ψ (or T ) is semi-decomposable if for every n we can find a model M of
ψ and partition 〈Aℓ : ℓ < n〉 of M to infinite subsets such that:
(∗) for every finite set ∆1 of formulas in L(τT ) there is a finite set ∆2 of formulas
in L(T ) such that
(∗∗) if for ℓ < n, kℓ < ω and a¯ℓ, b¯ℓ ∈ kℓ(Aℓ) and a¯ℓ, b¯ℓ realize the same ∆2-type
in M and ℓ = 0 ⇒ a¯ℓ = b¯ℓ, then a¯0ˆa¯1ˆ . . . a¯n−1, b¯0ˆb¯1ˆ . . . b¯n−1 realize the
same ∆1-type in M .
3) We say almost decomposable if the function ∆1 7→ ∆2 does not depend on n.
3.10 Claim. 1) If T is pseudo decomposable, then we can find T1 ⊇ T such that:
(a) for any model M1 of T1 we have: (Aut(M1 ↾ τ(T )) has cardinality 2
‖M1‖
hence some f ∈ Aut(M1 ↾ τ(T )) is not definable in M1 even with parame-
ters
(b) if T = {ψ} then for models of T1, in the logic L(Qψ) we can interpret second
order logic on M1
(c) we can embed also some product Π{Gi : i < ‖M1‖}, Gi a nontrivial group.
2) If T is semi-decomposable then T is pseudo decomposable.
3) If T is almost decomposable, then it is semi-decomposable and for any saturated
model of cardinality λ (or just λ+-resplended model of T ), λ > |T |, we can find
〈Ai : i < λ〉 as in 3.10, in fact:
(a) if a¯i, b¯i ∈ ω>(Ai) for i < λ, a¯0 = b0, tp(a¯i, ∅,M) = tp(b¯i, ∅,M) then
a¯i0ˆ . . . ˆa¯in , b¯i0ˆ . . . ˆb¯in realizes the same type in M for any i0 < . . . <
in < λ
(b) (M,Ai)i∈ω is λ-saturated for ω ∈ [λ]<λ.
For Boolean Algebras we can decompose the set of atoms, but the image of an
element is not deciphered so this theory is not even pseudo decomposable.
Be careful, the statement “B is the Boolean Algebra generated by the close-open
intervals of a linear order I” is not first order (this follows by the compactness so if
T1 extend the theory of Boolean algebras then it has a model with no undefinable
automorphism). Now for the first problem, 3.3, the hope is that failure pseudo
indecomposability is enough for compactness, it is of course necessarily by 3.10.
3.11 Question(Cherlin): What occurs for vector spaces over finite fields?
Let F be a (fixed) finite field and let ψF be the conjunction of the axioms of
vector spaces over the field F (we have binary function symbols for x + y, x − y,
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individual constant 0 and unary functions Fc for c ∈ F to denote multiplication by
c). There is T1 ⊇ {ψF} such that for models of T1, in the logic L(QautψF ) we can
interpret second order logic on M1 (similarly for a finitely generated field).
Remark. Also for a general field this works, except that we do not have the quan-
tifier as ψF is an infinite conjunction of first order formulas.
Why? Enough to have T1 such that; for M
∗ a model of T1:
(i) PM
∗
1 , P
M∗
2 are disjoint subsets of the vector space
(ii) PM
∗
1 ∪ P
M∗
2 is an independent set in the vector space
(iii) F1 is a unary function, F1 ↾ P
M∗
ℓ is one-to-one onto M
∗ for ℓ = 1, 2
(iv) F2, a two-place function, is a pairing function.
How is the interpretation? For any function g from PM
∗
1 to P
M∗
2 there is an
automorphism f of the vector space such that:
x ∈ PM1 ⇒ f(x) = x+ g(x)
x ∈ PM2 ⇒ f(x) = x.
My impression is that any reasonable example will fall easily one way or the other
by existing methods.
∗ ∗ ∗
3.12 Definition. Let M be a model of T, P ⊆ M . We say T ′ = Th(M,P ) has
the automorphic embeddability property over P if for every model (M ′, P ′) of T ′,
every automorphism f of M ′ ↾ P ′ can be extended to an automorphism of M .
3.13 Question Characterize the theories T ′ = Th(M,P ) which has the automorphic
embeddability property over P .
This looks hard on us as characterization of this would probably involve P−(n)-
diagrams as in classification over a predicate; on the case with no two cardinal
models (i.e. ‖M‖ > |PM | assuming there is λ = λ<λ ≥ |T |), see [Sh 234]. The
general case is, unfortunately, still in preparation ([Sh 322])); see end of §6.
∗ ∗ ∗
There are other ways to consider quantification over automorphisms:
For a model M let (M,Aut(M)) be the two sorted model, one sort is M , the
other is the group Aut(M), with the application function, that is in the formulas,
we allow forming f(x) for x of first sort, f of second sort. We may replace Aut(M)
by the semi-group of endomorphisms or one-to-one endomorphisms.
Now for a variety V , the complicatedness of the first order theory of the endo-
morphism semi-group End(Fλ) of the free algebra with λ generators is reasonably
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understood (see [Sh 61]) but so far not the automorphism group in the general case
though several specific cases were analyzed, (see [ShTr 605], [BTV91]).
3.14 Problem: For which varieties V , letting Fα be the free algebra in V generated
by {xi : i < α}, can we in Aut(Fλ) (first order) interpret second order theory of
λ? We hope for a solution which depend “lightly” on λ (like Aut(λ,=))? We may
allow quantification on elements or even use (Fλ,Aut(Fλ)); but, of course, better
is if we succeed to regain it.
The following property looks like a relevant dividing line
3.15 Definition. We say the variety V is Aut-decomposable if:
if Fω2 is the algebra generated freely by {xi : i < ω + ω} for V and f ∈
Aut(Fω2) satisfies f(xn) = xn for n < ω, then we have:
f maps 〈xω+n : n < ω〉Fω2 to itself.
Why? For varieties V with this property we can repeat the analysis of Aut(λ,=)
which is the group of permutations of λ; though first order interpretation of elements
has to be reconsidered. But this is not needed in generalizing the “upper bound”,
the equivalences. That is for proving, say V with countable vocabulary for simplic-
ity, that Th(Aut(Fℵα )) depend “lightly” on α; i.e. if for ℓ = 1, 2, αℓ = δℓ + γℓ, γℓ <
((2ℵ0)+)ω (ordinal exponentiations) and Min{cf(α), (2ℵ0)+} = Min{cf(α2), (2ℵ0)+}, γ1 =
γ2 then Th(Aut(Fℵ1 )) = Th(Aut(Fℵα2 )). On the other hand, if it fails an auto-
morphism of Fλ code a complicated subset of λ.
∗ ∗ ∗
We may look at questions on “are there logics with specified properties?”
An old problem (see [BF]):
3.16 Question: Is there an ℵ1-compact extension of L(Q) which has interpolation
(Craig)?
I prefer
3.17 Question: Is there in addition to first order logic a compact logic which has
interpolation?
Barwise prefers to look at definability properties of logics (e.g. characterizing
L∞,ω) but my taste goes to:
3.18 Problem: Find (nontrivial) implications between properties of logics.
See for example [Mw85], [Sh 199]; interpolation and Beth theorems are, under rea-
sonable assumption, equivalent; and amalgamation essentially implies compactness.
After great popularity in the seventies, the interest has gone down, a contributing
factor may have been the impression that there are mainly counterexamples. This
seems to me too early to despair.
However, Vannanen’s book [Va9x] should appear.
3.19 Discussion: So we are interested in enriching first order logic by additional
quantifiers preserving compactness and getting interpolation.
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A natural play is to allow second order variablesX but restrict the existential quan-
tifier to cases when the relation P (or function) satisfies some first order sentence ψ
with some specific old R as a parameter (e.g. P is f , an automorphism of a model
of ψ, a case discussed above). Another way ([Sh 43]) is to replace “exist” by “the
family of those satisfying it belongs to a family D(M) of such relations over M”.
An example introduced in [Sh 43] is the case of a unary predicate, with D(M) being
the club filter on [|M |]ℵ0 ; or equivalently for the strength of the logic, the family
of stationary subsets of [|M |]ℵ0 . Those quantifiers are (aaP ), (stP ), respectively.
This logic has many properties like L(Q), see [BKM78], some like second order,
[ShKf 150], [Sh 199].
Now interpolation holds for the pair of logic2 (L(Qcf≤ℵ0), L(aa)) which means: if
ϕℓ is a sentence in L(Q
cf
≤ℵ0
)(τℓ) for ℓ = 1, 2 and ⊢ ϕ1 → ϕ2 then for some
ψ ∈ L(aa)(τ1 ∩ τ2) we have ⊢ ϕ1 → ψ and ⊢ ψ → ϕ2. Also the Beth closure
of L(Qcf
≤2ℵ0
) is compact so there is a compact logic which satisfies the “implicit
definability implies the explicit definability”; moreover, is reasonably natural (at
least in my eyes). Seems near the mark but not in it. Consider (see [HoSh 271])
the following logic: let ℵ0 < κ < λ and κ, λ are compact cardinals, and expand first
order logic by all the connectives of the form
∧
D
ϕi where D is a κ-complete ultra-
filter on some θ ∈ [κ, λ), meaning naturally {i < θ : ϕi} ∈ D. It has interpolation
but not full compactness (only µ-compact for µ < κ).
∗ ∗ ∗
More formally and fully
3.20 Definition. 1) Assume
(a) ψ(R¯, S) be a sentence (usually in first order) in the vocabulary R¯, i.e. R¯ is a
list with no repetitions of predicates and function symbols, S an additional
predicate, each have a given arity (for notational simplicity R0 is a unary
predicate for “the universe” each Rℓ is a predicate)
(b) D is a function, its domain is KR¯ = {M :M a model, the vocabulary of M
is {Ri : 1 + i < ℓg(R¯)}, R
M
0 = |M |},D(M) is a family of subsets of
{N : N is an expansion of M by SN} and, of course, if f is an isomorphism
from M1 onto M2 then f maps D(M1) onto D(M2).
The quantifier Qϕ¯,D, syntactically acts as (Qϕ¯,DS)ϑ where S is a variable on n-place
relations, ϕ¯ = 〈ϕi(x¯i, z¯i) : i < ℓg(R¯)〉 and ℓg(x¯i) = arity(Ri)〉 and Mϕ¯,a¯ =Mϕ¯,a¯[A]
is defined as in Definition 3.2 and
A |=(Qϕ¯,DS)ϑ(S, a¯) iff
{S : S an n-place relation on {x : ϕ0(x, z¯)}
and (Mϕ¯,a¯[A], S) |= ϑ(S, a¯)}
belongs to D(Mϕ¯,a¯[A]).
2Qcf
≤ℵ0
tells us the cofinality of a linear order is ≤ ℵ0
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2) Similarly when for definingMϕ¯,a¯[A] we replace equality by an equivalence relation
R1.
A variant of 3.17 is
3.21 Question: Is there a reasonably defined such quantifier Q such that L(Q) is
compact and has interpolation? or at least has the Beth property?
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§4 Relatives of the main gap
A main gap theorem here means, for a family of classes of models, that for each
class K either we have a complete set of invariants for models of K (presently,
which are basically just sets) or it has quite complicated models (see below after
4.11).
This seems obviously a worthwhile dichotomy, if it occurs indeed, and have been
approached as a dichotomy on the number of models (but see below).
We know for a countable first order, T complete for simplicity, that I(ℵα, T ) =:
{M/ ∼=: M |= T & ‖M‖ = ℵα} behave nicely (either I(ℵα, T ) = 2ℵα for every
α > 0 or < iω1(|α| + ℵ0) for every α). But many relatives of this question are
open.
I thought a priori on several of them that they will be easier, but have worked more
on the case of models so the earlier solution in [Sh:c] does not prove this thought
wrong; still this a priori opinion is not necessarily true.
4.1 Question 1) Prove the main gap for the class of ℵ1-saturated models.
2) Prove the main gap for the class of ℵ0-saturated models.
Now 4.1(1) have looked a priori relatively not hard, in fact the work in [Sh:c]
seems to solve it “except” for lack of regular types, so in the decomposition theorem
we are lacking how to exhaust the model.
Another direction is:
4.2 Problem: Let T be countable stable complete first order theory. Show that if
¬(∗), then T has otop (or dop; for otp we allow types over countable sets), where
(∗) if M0 ≺Mℓ ≺ C for ℓ = 1, 2 and
M1
⋃
M0
M2, (i.e. tp∗(M2,M2) does not fork over M0) then there is a prime
model (even Fℵ0 -prime) over M1 ∪M2.
Note: For superstable this is true (this was the main last piece for the main gap,
see [Sh:c, Ch.XII]).
4.3 Discussion: Our problem is that the proof there uses induction on ranks, and
generally stable theories have less well understood theory of types (not enough
regular types exist), just as in 4.1. However, if we assume T superstable without
DOP, then every regular type is either trivial (= the dependence relation is) or
of depth zero ([Sh:c, Ch.X,§7]). There is some parallel theorem for stable theories
without DOP, it may be helpful.
Maybe relevant is the theory of types for stable T in [Sh:c, Ch.V,§5], [Sh 429] and
Hernandez [He92] which proved that if I0, I1 are indiscernible not orthogonal then
for some indiscernible J, Iℓ ≤s J ([Sh:c, Ch.V,§1]), but in spite of early expectation
this has not been enough to solve 4.1(1).
Where could 4.2 help? For the theories which are “low” for the main gap, a model
is characterized up to isomorphism by its L∞,ℵ1(dimensional quantifier) theory.
But we may look at logics allowing e.g. a sequence of quantifiers with countable
length (even ω1), as investigated by the Finnish school. We know that for unstable
theories, and for stable theories with DOP we have the nonstructure, see Hyttinen
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Shelah [HySh 676]. It seems that 4.2 would complete a piece in finding another
dividing line here. Some stable, unsuperstable theories become low. Essentially,
the hope is that either every model of T can be coded by trees with at most δ∗ levels,
δ fixed, even countable or ≤ ω1 or we have the order property (even independence
property) in a stronger logic (in NOPOT or NDOP holds). However, 4.2 is not
enough, we need also a decomposition theorem.
4.4 Question: If T is countable stable with NDOP and NOPOT and (∗) of 4.2
holds, does the decomposition theorem hold at least for shallow T ?
Interpretation of groups may be relevant, particularly non-isolated types, because
non-orthogonal, weakly orthogonal types tend to involve groups.
Note that here the existnece of Fℓℵ0 -primary model on N ∪ {a} included inside a
given M ⊇ N ∪ {a} is not assured.
Another problem is
4.5 Problem: Prove the main gap for KT =: ∩{M1 ↾ T : M1 a model of T1, T ⊆
T1, |T1| ≤ 2ℵ0}.
Note that if (∀λ < 2ℵ0)2λ = 2ℵ0 , then we can find one T1 which suffices (as
by Robinson lemma we have “amalgamation” for theories, so there is a universal
(oven “saturated”) T1, i.e. if T
′
1 ⊇ T is complete, |T
′
1| ≤ 2
ℵ0 by changing names of
predicates not in τ(T ) we can embed T ′1 into T2 over T .
Like all these problems, possibly a large part of the work is already done, but
though a priori I thought this was easier, it is not necessarily true. The natural
hidden order property is by ∃≥λxϕ(x, y, z) (cardinality quantifiers) (maybe on the
number of equivalence classes or dimension for ∆-indiscernible sets, ∆ finite), we
hope there will not be a need to consider several cardinality quantifiers simulta-
neously. If M is a model of T which looks like (A, 0, P, E), A = ω ∪ {(n,m, ℓ) :
ℓ < k(n,m)}, P = ω, F1, F2 unary functions, Fℓ(n1, n2, k) = nℓ for ℓ = 1, 2, E =
{((n1,m1, k1), (n2,m1, k2)) : n1 = n2,m1 = m2 and k1, k2 < k(n1,m1)} and the
function k(n,m) random enough, T has a hidden order property, that is, the for-
mula ϕ(x, y) =: (∃z)(F1(z) = x & F2(z) = y & (∃≥ℵ1z′)(z′Ez)).
We phrase it appropriately (and there are fewer divisions).
The very low parts of the hierarchy have been analyzed, i.e. the bottom part:
categorical
ℵα > 2
ℵ0 ⇒ I(ℵα,KT ) = 1 or I(ℵα,KT ) ≥ 2
|α|.
For the main gap, we can assume T is superstable and we should analyze for
M ∈ KT , which we know is ℵε-saturated and it is natural to analyze the different
dimensions.
Note: If T is a theory of one equivalence relation E saying there is an equivalence
class with n elements, for infinitely many n, it is not in the lowest class, but still we
understand it. For the T above, if for every n we have ℵ0 classes with n elements
then KT = {M : there are ‖M‖ classes of cardinality ‖M‖, for each x ∈ M , has
‖M‖-classes with (x/E)-elements and ∀n∃x(|X/E| = n)}.
In the first case (i.e. I(ℵα,KT ) = 1) every model is saturated. We expect that
if I(ℵα,KT ) = 2
α, then for M ∈ KT , there is an equivalence relation between
indiscernible sets but on the set of equivalence classes, there is no further structure
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(well, maybe unary “predicates”) such that no two equivalence classes have the
same dimension.
In general, the theme taken for granted is:
4.6 Thesis: If K is a reasonable3 class of models then:
the behaviour of the function I(ℵα,K) is uniform, the “same” for all relevant
cardinals.
Have not really looked. The expectation is that after this level, we’ll have 22
α
, (and
also 2|α|
ℵ0
, 2|α|
2ℵ0
, etc), and in(|α|), (or in(|α|ℵ0 ),in(|α|2
ℵ0
)) and iζ(|α|) for each
ζ ∈ [ω, ω1) and then after our ω1 steps we have ℵα 7→ 2ℵα .
The main4 question left in [Sh:c] is
4.7 Problem: Prove the main gap for uncountable T .
The problem in proving is the lack of primary models, particularly over non-
forking triples of models. Maybe more interpretation of groups will help in solving
this. Maybe replacing “primary models” by prime models, and isolated types by
unavoidable ones may help.
(Recall that B is primary over A if B = A∪{ai : i < α} and tp(ai, A∪{aj : j < i})
is isolated for i < α.)
Isolated types have been great (for ℵ0-categoricity, no T with exactly two countable
models, Morley theorem), but for an uncountable theory they are not sufficient, the
lack of them does not witness much. Still there can be prime models.
Maybe we should look at derived non-elementary classes, where we look for
hidden order and if there is none we get nicer properties. Maybe even define such
classes inductively on α < ω1 (or evenD(x = x, L,∞), but carry enough connection
to the original T to be able to finish soon (and carry enough to continue, see [Sh:h],
[Sh 600]).
It may be reasonable to start with analyzing unidimensional T (concerning 4.7).
4.8 Thesis: All such problems have a “good” solution, (unlike Ehrenheuft Conjec-
ture, see [Sh 54], see §3).
The audience asked
4.9 Question: Can a theory T be “nice” in spite of having many models, maybe
still models of T can be understood by invariants.
4.10 Answer: “Nice” certainly yes (see §5 as you may choose to consider say linear
order as reasonable invariants and so ask for which first order theories such invariant
suffice). But not true, if you define a generalized cardinal invariant as follows (for
simplicity |T | = ℵ0).
Depth zero: cardinal invariant is a cardinal
Depth α + 1: cardinal invariant are sets of sequences of length ≤ 2ℵ0 of cardinal
invariants of depth α or a cardinal invariant of depth α
depth δ for δ limit: depth α for some α < δ
3but see on rigidity!
4why I have been feeling so? As for almost all this book, countability plays a minor role
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4.11 Claim. If models of T of cardinality ℵα are characterized up to isomorphism
by generalized cardinal of depth ≤ γT , then I(ℵα, T ) ≤ iγT+1(2
ℵ0) (see [Sh 200]).
Really, the main gap for countable complete T ’s is a division to three cases. If T
is in the upper case, model of T codes stationary sets; if T is in the lower case, a
model can be described by a tree with ≤ ω levels and depth ≤ γT < ω1; and if
T is in the middle case, a model can be described by a tree with ≤ ω levels, but
can have depth an arbitrarily large ordinal. The first case is T unsuperstable or is
NDOP or NDTOP, the second case are the deep theories (which are superstable,
NDOP, NOTOP) and the third are the rest.
A theological question is which of those two dividing lines is the more striking
dividing line. Probably between the upper case and the rest. Clearly the fact that
from the isomorphism type of a model of T we can naturally compute a stationary
set modulo a club (see 4.13 below), getting any such set, say that the class of models
of T is very complicated, whereas a tree with ω levels seems reasonably understood
though their number (up to isomorphism) is large. We can look at it in another
way: if we “understood” the isomorphism types of M , forcing notions “which do
not do much damage” (including preserving inequality of cardinality of the relevant
sets), preserve non isomorphism of models if T is in the lower or middle case. E.g.
if λ = cf(λ) > |T | = ℵ0 and P is a forcing notion not adding ω-sequences to λ
preserving cardinalities ≤ λ then P preserves non isomorphism of models of T of
cardinality ≤ λ iff T is in the lower of middle case. It seems a very weak demand
of a complete set of invariants to be preserved by such a change in the universe.
This is the intended meaning of the word (main) gap here, though to say that the
isomorphism types of models of T are all “simple”, “well understood” is open to
variations, here the “good, well understood” case is very good, and the “bad” are
so bad, that it is an evidence to this dividing line to be a major natural division
(on c.c.c. forcing - see 4.18 below). E.g. we may above require the forcing to add
no (< λ)-sequences getting the same division.
The audience asked
4.12 Question: Can we assign stationary sets as invariants?
4.13 Answer: In restricted classes of models it works but the question is what the
connection should be between the model and the stationary set. That is, generally,
there are enough stationary sets to code models in cardinality λ, so we have to
say M,S(M)/Dλ (or D≤κ(λ) or whatever) should be nicely connected. Hence this
remains vague. Note that if we aim not at a complete set of invariants but as
an evidence for nonstructure, then we can. That is, for any T in the upper case
we can naturally assign a stationary subset of λ modulo Dλ as an invariant to
models of T of cardinality λ = cf(λ) such that any stationary subset of λ (or of
{δ < λ : cf(δ) = ℵ0}) appears. E.g. let T be unsuperstable. If say M has universe
λ = cf(λ) > ℵ1, use {δ < λ : M ↾ δ ≺ M and for every b¯ ∈ ω>M every countable
subtype of tp(b,Mδ,M) is realized in Mδ}.
[Why? Let λ = cf(λ) > |T |+ µ, where µ = cf(µ) > ℵ0. Let Φ be proper template
for Ktrω , EMτ(T )(I,Φ) a model of T , witnessing unsuperstability, let I be a linear
order of the form λ + J, J isomorphic to the inverse of µ and for δ ∈ S∗ = {δ <
λ : cf(δ) = ℵ0} let ηδ be an increasing ω-sequence of ordinals with limit δ. Now for
S ⊆ S∗ let IS = ω>(λ + J) ∪ {ηδ : δ ∈ S} ∪ {η : η ∈ ω(λ + J) is eventually zero}.
We can check that the invariant of EM(IS ,Φ) is S/D
˜
λ.]
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However, this is not an invariant which characterizes up to isomorphism. The
cases of NDOP, NOTOP are in face easier (can use the end of [Sh:e, Ch.III,§3]).
Classifying will not die as
4.14 Thesis: In any reasonable classification (in the present sense) there are exam-
ples of the “complicated” class which are actually well understood so should be
prototypes of another class which is analyzable.
Hodges in his thesis had asked about
4.15 Question: When does a first order theory have a ≺-minimal model in λ? What
can be PrSp(T )?
4.16 Definition. 1) M is a ≺-minimal model in λ if it can be elementary embed-
dable into any other model of N of Th(M) of cardinality λ.
2) PrSp(T ) = {λ :M has a ≺ -minimal model of T }.
We may consider
4.17 Definition. PrSp′(T ) = {(λ, µ) :M a model of T of cardinality µ which is
(λ,≺)-embeddable} where M is (λ,≺)-embeddable if it is embeddable into every
model of Th(M) of cardinality λ.
Hodges gave some examples of PrSp(T ) and then I add a few others. Hodges
showed that if T is the theory of infinite atomic Boolean Algebra, then PrSp(T ) =
{λ : λ is strong limit}. Also if I is a linear order with no monotonic sequence of
elements of length λ, λ = cf(λ), then in EM(I,Φ) there is no formula defining
when restricted to some set, a well order of length λ.
My old remarks and a theorem of Hrushovski that “unidimensional stable theory
is superstable” gives
Fact: Assume T is stable, cf(λ) > |T |; if λ ∈ PrSp(T ) then T is unidimensional
(hence superstable) and cf(µ) > |T | ⇒ µ ∈ PrSp(T ).
[why?
Case 1: T not unidimensional.
As in [Sh:c, Ch.V,§2].
Case 2: T is unidimensional, superstable. As in [Sh:c, Ch.IX,§2].
∗ ∗ ∗
As discussed above we know that for complicated theories (say unstable or un-
superstable or ones with DOP or OTOP), models can code stationary sets hence
“isomorphism types are very set theoretic sensitive”. E.g. changing by forcing
shooting a club of λ = cf(λ) disjoints to some S. It is natural to consider: “nice
forcing notion can make non-isomorphic models to isomorphic”.
4.18 Problem: For which first order countable T is there a c.c.c. forcing notion
making non-isomorphic isomorphic.
Now (see [BLSh 464]) for unsuperstable T the answer is no and so with super-
stable with DOP or OTOP.
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By [LwSh 518], there is T among the remaining with the answer no, after pre-
liminary c.c.c. forcing. Laskowski and me agree there is a serious unsatisfactory
point in the paper, but do not agree on its identity. He thinks it is the preliminary
c.c.c. forcing. However, I think that as anyhow we deal with forcing this is minor,
but the restriction on T major (whereas he think not).
Newelski told me that for T superstable countable, p ∈ Sm(A) with uncountably
many stationarization ([Sh:c, Ch.III]), he considered the meagre ideal on the set
of stationarizations of p (in connection with Vaught conjecture for superstable T ).
Subsequently in [LwSh 560] we used the null ideal on this space for proving in the
proof (could have used the meagre). He asked
4.19 Question: Are there T,A, p as above such that the ideal of null sets and of
meagre sets are different?
∗ ∗ ∗
We can measure the number of models in other ways.
4.20 Definition. : Let I ′κ(λ,K) = {M/ ≡∞,κ: M ∈ K, ‖M‖ = λ} where K is
a class of models of a fixed vocabulary, τ(K) ≡∞,κ is the equivalence relation of
having the same L∞,κ- theory. If κ = ℵ0 we may omit it, if K = {M : M |= T } we
may write T .
Starting my Ph.D. studies, I note (concentrating on κ = ℵ0 but Rabin was not
enthusiastic)
4.21 Theorem. If K is elementary (or defined by ψ ∈ Lλ+,κ), λ = λ
<κ ≥ |τ(K)|
and Iκ(λ,K) ≤ λ, then λ ≤ µ⇒ Iκ(µ,K) ≤ Iκ(λ,K).
(Later I understand that this is easy by Levy absoluteness; see [Sh 11] and see
Nadel’s thesis).
So
4.22 Question: For first order T , what can
Min{λ : Iκ(λ, T ) ≤ λ = λ
κ}
be when it is < ∞, i.e. can you give a better bound than the Hanf number of
L(τ(T )+ℵ0)+,ω (well ordering) L∞,ω.
Lately, Laskowski and me investigate what can be the supremum of the L∞,κ
Karp height for models of T , so a theory is considered complicated if this is not
bounded; this is closely related, see [LwSh 560]. The point is that while case
κ = ℵ0 is opaque the cases of many bigger κ is at least at present, not a dead end,
supporting 2.18.
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§5 Unstable first order theory
The major theme of classification theory has been for me, since [Sh 1]:
5.1 Meta Problem: Find worthwhile dividing lines on the family of (complete first
order) theories.
A dividing line is not just a good, interesting property, it is one for which we have
something to say on both sides; so for some problems naturally a solution goes by
working on each side separately.
Of course phrased as “find dividing lines among the possible mathematical the-
ories” this is too general and too vague to lead to mathematical theorems. But it
is quite natural to restrict ourselves to the family of classes of models of first order
theories (complete, and even countable).
Almost by definition, a dividing line is an interesting property (though not in-
versely: the class of non groups among (A,F ), F an associative two-place function
or non 0-minimal first order theories are not so remarkable), but it is remarkable
that, for our contexts, there are some. I have changed the name of [Sh:a] from
“stability and the number of nonisomorphic models” to “classification theory”in
order to stress its aim - finding meaningful dividing lines.
We believe good test problems are needed and, of course, problems on the number
of non-isomorphic models were inherently interesting and serve well. But they
could not serve for unstable theories. We shall see below how some problems
succeed or fails in this role, but sometime we do not know of a good candidate.
I have considered at various times λ 7→ sup{|S(A)|+ : |A| ≤ λ}, Keisler’s order
(i.e. saturation of ultraproducts), SP (see below) and later ⊳∗ ([Sh 500]) and the
existence of universal models. Sometime getting a full ZFC answer (on which I
work hard in [Sh:c]) seems too much so decide that it is reasonable to content
myself with:
5.2 Half ZFC or Poor Man ZFC Answer: The result on the lower half of a dividing
line will be ZFC (or semi-ZFC, i.e. depending on cardinal arithmetic in relevant
cardinals), whereas in the complicated, upside we allow consistency results (in semi-
ZFC: you may distinguish between cases to high consistency strength and those
really consistent you may argue to add diamond, etc.).
This may help, as getting a too fine division is not our aim. Also if we are more
interested in the dividing lines themselves, consistency results should be enough.
This is even more relevant in classifying non-elementary classes and in classification
over a predicate.
Note that if we look at “having complicated phenomena” as barrier to positive
theorems, clearly a consistency result suffices.
∗ ∗ ∗
5.3 Discussion: I find it particularly nice if the property have some equivalent defi-
nitions by “outside notions” and “by inside notions”, some got for dealing with the
“down side”, some with “the upside”. To clarify consider the example of stability;
unstable theories are characterized by the order property (inside property for the
upside, helpful in proving the class of models of an unstable T is complicated), sta-
ble theories are characterized by having finite local ranks (Rn(p, ϕ, 2) < ω) (inside
property for the downside; helpful in developing stability theory, showing we can
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in some senses understand the class of models of a stable T ), instability is char-
acterized by “for every λ for some A, |S(A)| > λ ≥ |A|” (a weak outside property
for the upside), stability by “for every λ, |A| ≤ λ⇒ |S(A)| ≤ λ|T | (a weak outside
property for the downside); late coming outside property characterizing “unstable
T ” is, “has many κ-resplended models of cardinality λ” where λ = λ<κ > 2|T |,
(outside property for the upside), “stable T has exactly one |T |+-resplended model
of cardinality λ when λ = λ|T |” (outside property for downside; see [Sh:e, Ch.V]).
∗ ∗ ∗
Considering unstable theories, we knew they have the independence property or
the strict order property, but not necessarily both, so the simplest prototypes of
unstable theories are the Tord, the theory of dense linear order and the theory Trg
of random graph. We have earlier in §2 discussed (k,m)−∗-NIP and it is natural to
ask on the inter-relations of them, the strict order property and the independence
property, see [Sh 715].
For the neighborhood of Trg, the problem I had chosen as a test problem was
5.4 Problem: Classify first order theories by
SP (T ) =
{
(λ, κ) : every model M of T of cardinality λ
has an elementary extension N of cardinality λ
which is κ-saturated
}
or, for simplicity
SP ′(T ) = {(λ, κ) ∈ SP (T ) : λ2
|T |
= λ > 2κ and κ = cf(κ) > 2|T |}.
[Why “for every M”, not just there is M? Because then, letting T = Th(M),M =
M1+M2, Tℓ = Th(Mℓ) and T2 trivial (e.g. Th(ω,=), that is, having infinite models,
all relations empty) we easily can check that SP ′(T ) is maximal; that is, equal to
= {(λ, κ) : λ = λ2
|T |
, λ > 2κ, κ = cf(κ) > 2|T |}) and the intended intuition is to
say that T, T1 has the same complicatedness.
Now [Sh:93] give a semi-ZFC answer to the question on for which T is SP′(T ) is
minimal (i.e. are maximally complicated under this criterion).
5.5 Theorem. If T is not simple, then SP ′(T ) is minimal (that is, is equal to
{(λ, κ) : λ = λκ, κ = cf(κ) > 2|T |}).
The other directions, if T is not simple (hence having the tree property) then SP(T )
is minimal, holds by [Sh:c]. For this [Sh:93] began the generalization [Sh:a, Ch.II,III]
to simple theories, I suggested to some to continue but only lately Hrushovski5
5his preprint has not appeared (and, unlike the others, will not), it investigates the generaliza-
tion of “geometric stability theory” and group interpretations for theories minimal for D(−, L,∞).
He has some theories of fields and investigating finite models with few types in mind
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and then Kim, Pillay Laskowski, Buechler, Morgan, Shami and others use and
investigate parallels of [Sh:c] to simple theories; for surveys see [GIL97x], [KiPi].
We expect that
5.6 Conjecture: There is a finer division of simple theories to ω + 1 families, by
the properties Prn such that if T has the Prn-th property for every n then SP
′(T )
is minimal, two theories of the same family (i.e. satisfying Prn but not Prn+1(T )
and let n = n(T )) essentially have the same SP′(T ), but if two have different n(T )
then consistently there is a cardinal separating them (in the SP(T ′)\ SP(T ′′) if
n(T ′′) < n(T ′)); this should be the relatively easy part. A prototype of a counter-
example to the n-th property, k ≥ 3 is the model completion of Tk, where Tk say:
(x1, . . . , xn) is symmetric irreflexive, R(x1, . . . , xn)→ P (x), xSy → P (x) & ¬P (y)
and ¬(∃x, . . . , xny)(¬P (y) & R(x1, . . . , xn) &
n∧
ℓ=1
xℓSy).
The intention is that Prn(T ) is a syntactical property which implies:
⊠ if M is a model of T, µ = µ|T | ≤ ‖M‖ ≤ 2µ and M∗ ≺M, ‖M∗‖ ≤ |T |, p∗ ∈
S(M∗),Φ =: {ϕ(x, a¯) : ∈¯M and {ϕ(x, a¯)}∪p∗ does not fork overM∗}, then
can be represented as
⋃
i<µ
Γi and ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ∈ Γi ⇒ p∗ ∪ {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} does
not fork over M∗. (For n = 2, [Sh:93, 7.8] is a version). We may use [Sh
234].
What is SP (Trg)?
For any µ let log(µ) = Min{λ : 2λ ≥ µ} if, now if µ ≥ (log(µ))<κ then (λ, κ) ∈
SP (Trg) (using [EK]). If (log(µ))
<κ > µ this is conected to SCH. By [GiSh 597]
the answer is independent. Note that Trg is minimal among simple theories in the
sense that SP (T ) is maximal among unstable theories.
It is not a priori clear that the answer is so coherent, there may be a myriad of
properties with many independent results; I have not tried this direction. This will
not help us much in classification. Here I am not sure if the “armies of god” will
prevail. In other words, I am not sure it is a good test problem any more.
∗ ∗ ∗
As said above any unstable theory has the independence property or strict order
property. So among unstable theories the theory of random graphs and the theory
of linear order are in some sense the simplest. So we can expect to have a theory of
some family of first order theories for which linear order is a prototype (as discussed
earlier for theory of random graph). Best, of course, is if we can have something for
all T without the independence property (see after 2.9). It was encouraging ([Sh:c,
Ch.III,§7]).
5.7 Theorem. (T first order without the independence property).
If κ > |T | is regular A ⊆ C then we can find a κ-saturated M ≺ C such that
A ⊆ M and M is in some sense constructible over A : |M | = A ∪ {ai : i < α} and
tp(ai, A ∪ {aj : j < i}) does not split over some Bi ⊆ A ∪ {aj : j < i} which has
cardinality < κ.
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For long there was no reasonable candidate for test question: (the results on λ 7→
sup{|S(A)| : |A| ≤ λ} were satisfactory but do not lead to something). Now [LwSh
560] start to classify by the L∞,κ-Karp height; note that some superstable theories
are maximal there.
We may look for a parallel of [Sh:93], e.g.
5.8 Definition. Assume T without the independence property and λ = λ<λ +
|T | < µ,M ∈ EC(µ, T ), N ≺L|T |+,|T |+ M, ‖N‖ = 2
|T |, p∗ ∈ S(N) and
Pℓ = Pℓ(p
∗,M) =:
{
p ∈ S(M) :p in some sense does not fork over p∗
which means that p∗ ⊆ p and :
(a) if ℓ = 1 letting Pϕ = Pϕ(x,y¯) = {c¯ ∈
ℓg(y¯)M : ϕ(x, a¯) ∈ p}
we have (N,Pϕ)ϕ ≺L
|T |+,|T |+
(M,Pϕ)ϕ
(b) if ℓ = 2, then for every ϕ(x, a¯) ∈ p and for A ⊆ N, |A| ≤ |T |
there is ϕ(x, a¯′) ∈ p∗ such that a¯, a¯′
realizes the same type over A inside M
}
Fℓ(p,M) = ∪{p : p ∈ Pℓ(p
∗,M)}.
We can make Fℓ(p,M) to a Boolean Algebra (as in the later parts of [Sh:93]).
5.9 Question: Can you force this Boolean Algebra by a λ+-c.c. λ-complete forcing
notion to be “simple” in some sense? best: union of λ subalgebra which are interval
Boolean Algebra.
Probably too much to hope for but the direction may be reasonable, see more
5.36 - 5.40 and [Sh 715].
∗ ∗ ∗
Not having the strict order property look to me a priori very promising dividing
line, however, the test problems which look promising lead to smaller classes (see
below on [Sh 500, §2]). This includes
5.10 Definition. 1) The universality spectrum of T is
UvSp(T ) = {λ :T has a universal model, i.e. every other model of
T of cardinality λ can be elementarily embedded into it}
2) The pairs-Universality spectrum of T is
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UvpSp(T ) = {(λ, µ) :λ ≤ µ and there M ∈ EC(µ, T )
into which every N ∈ EC(λ, T ) can be
elementarily embedded}
(we can look at the size of a universal family; cov sheds light on the connections,
see [Sh 457], [DjSh 614]).
Under GCH for λ > |T | the answer is known, so we can look only for weak solutions
involving consistency, “semi-ZFC solutions” as suggested in 5.2 above.
Now the theory of universal graphs consistently has large universal spectrum even
for λ < 2<λ ([Sh 175a]). So once we know ([KjSh 409]) that the theory of linear
order has few (e.g. 2λ > λ++ ⇒ λ++ /∈ UvSp(Tord)), and that this applies to any
T with the strict order property, it raises hope that this is a good test problem for
that property.
Alas, it may be good but not for the strict order property as ([Sh 500, §2]) NSOP4
suffices where (see [Sh 500], [DjSh 692]):
5.11 Definition. 1) T has the SOP (the strong order property) if some type p(x¯, y¯)
defined in CT a partial order with arbitrarily long (< κ¯) chains).
2) T has SOPn (the strong n-order property, n ≥ 3) if for some formula ϕ(x¯, y¯):
(a) there is an infinite indiscernible sequence ordered by ϕ
(b) we cannot find m ≤ n and a¯0, . . . , a¯m−1, a¯m = a¯0 such that ϕ(a¯ℓ, a¯ℓ+1) for
ℓ < m.
3) T has SOP2 if some ϕ(x¯, y¯) has it which means that we can find in CT , a¯η ∈
ℓg(y¯)(CT ) for η ∈ ω>2 such that:
(a) if ηˆ〈ℓ〉 E ηℓ ∈ ω>2 for ℓ = 0, 1 then {ϕ(x¯, a¯η1), ϕ(x¯, a¯η0)} is inconsistent
(b) if η ∈ ω2 then {ϕ(x¯, a¯η↾n : n < ω} is inconsistent.
4) T has SOP1 is defined as in (3) only in clause (a) we demand η0 = ηˆ〈0〉.
5.12 Problem: 1) Develop a theory for NSOP T ’s.
2) Develop a theory for NSOPn T ’s.
3) Find additional evidence of complicatedness to the SOPn’s (and SOP).
Earlier I thought that the most promising is the case n = 3, a prototypical theory
seems Tfeq ([Sh 457]), but now we know that n = 2 is a real dividing line ([DjSh
692]). However, we have SOPn ⇒ SOPn+1 and for n ≥ 3 the inverse implication
fails, but for n = 1, 2?
Now [Sh 457, §1] indicates another direction, see Dzamonja Shelah [DjSh 710]; there
for theory T with tree coding we prove some non-existence of universal models.
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5.13 Definition. 1) The formula ϕ(x¯, y¯, z¯) is tree coding in T , if for every (equiv-
alently some) λ ≥ κ ≥ ℵ0 we can find in CT , c¯ν(ν ∈ κλ), b¯η(η ∈ κ>λ),
a¯α(α < κ) such that:
(a) |= ϕ[c¯ν , b¯η, a¯α] if η = ν ↾ α & ν ∈ κλ
(b) if α < κ and ν, ρ ∈ κλ and ν ↾ α 6= ρ ↾ α then ϕ(c¯ν , y¯, a¯α), ϕ(c¯ρ, y¯, a¯α) are
contradictory.
2) T has tree coding if some ϕ(x¯, y¯, z¯) has.
5.14 Problem: Develop the theory of T ’s without tree coding (and further non-
structure theorems for those with).
Clearly in some sense the dividing line stable/unstable is simpler than super-
stable/unsuperstable not to mention NDOP/DOP, etc. The following definitions
tries explicate this. The point being that many properties are properties of a for-
mula ϕ(x¯, y¯) in T .
5.15 Definition. Fix T and C = CT .
1) For first order formula ϕ = ϕ(x¯, y¯) and a¯0, . . . , a¯n−1 ∈
ℓg(y¯)
C, let uϕ(a¯0, . . . , a¯n−1) =
{u ⊆ n :|= (∃x¯)
∧
ℓ<n
ϕ(x¯, a¯ℓ)
cf(i∈u)} where ϕtrue = ψ, ψfalse = ¬ψ.
2) For first order formula ϕ = ϕ(x¯, y¯) let
Γϕ = {(n,u) :for some n < ω and a¯0, . . . , a¯n−1 ∈
ℓg(y¯)
C;
we have uϕ(a¯0, . . . , a¯n−1) = u}.
3) We let ΓT = {Γϕ : ϕ = ϕ(x¯, y¯) ∈ L(T )}. A division of first order theories is
straightly defined if: for some Γ it is the family of T such that Γ ∈ ΓT the first order
T are divided to those T ’s that Γ ∈ ΓT (the up sets) and those T ’s that Γ /∈ ΓT
(the down side).
4) Let ΓT,ϕ(x¯,y¯,z¯) = {Γϕ(x¯,y¯,c¯) : c¯ ∈
ℓg(z)C}.
5.16 Definition. 1) For Γ as above we say: T is Γ-high if Γ ∈ ΓT and Γ-low
otherwise.
2) We say that a class T of complete first order theories is straight if the truth value
of T ∈ T is determined by ΓT .
A variant which seems to capture the main point is:
5.17 Definition. 1) Let Γ∗ = {(n, F1, F2) : n < ω, F1, F2 are disjoint families of
sets of partial functions from {0, . . . , n− 1} to {true false}}.
2) We say that 〈a¯0, . . . , a¯n−1〉 does ϕ-realizes (n, F1, F2) ∈ Γ∗ if f ∈ F1 ⇒ C |=
(∃x¯)
∧
ℓ∈ Dom(f)
ϕ(x¯, a¯ℓ)
f(ℓ) and f ∈ F2 ⇒ C |= ¬(∃x¯)
∧
ℓ∈ Dom(f)
ϕ(x¯, a¯ℓ)
f(ℓ). We can
apply this to ϕ(x¯, y¯, c¯), c¯ from CT .
3) For Γ ⊆ Γ∗ we say that ϕ(x¯, y¯) has the weak Γ-property (in T ) if any (n, F1, F2) ∈
RUTGERS SEMINARS 1997 35
Γ is ϕ-realized by some 〈a¯0, . . . , a¯n−1〉. We say that ϕ(x¯, y¯) has the strong Γ-
property if for (n, F1, F2) ∈ Γ∗ we have (n, F1, F2) ∈ Γ iff (n, F1, F2) is ϕ-realized
by some 〈a¯0, . . . , a¯n−1〉. We say ϕ(x¯, y¯, z¯) has such a property if this holds for some
ϕ(x¯, y¯, c¯).
4) T has the weak/strong Γ-property if some ϕ(x¯, y¯, z¯) has it. T has the weak/strong
pure Γ-property if some ϕ(x¯, y¯) has it.
5) We say that a class (or property) T of complete first order theories is weakly/strong
simply high straight if for some Γ ⊆ Γ∗ we have: T ∈ T if T has the weak/strong
Γ-property in T . The class T is weakly/strongly simply low straight if it is the
compliment of a simply high straight one.
6) Omitting the “weak” and “strong” we shall mean weak(ly).
7) Γ∗∗ = {Γ ⊆ Γ∗: for some T , some ϕ(x¯, y¯) has the Γ-property}.
5.18 Fact: 1) For any Γ ⊆ Γ∗, the truth of “T has the weak Γ-property” is deter-
mined by ΓT .
2) Allowing in Definition 5.16(10, (2), 5.17 for the weak versions, formulas ϕ(x¯, y¯, c¯),
does not make a difference for having the Γ-property.
5.19 Observation: The following properties can be represented as “T has the weak
Γ-property”.
1) T is unstable.
2) T has the independence property.
3) T has the strict order property.
4) T has the tree property (equivalently, is not simple).
5) T has NSOPn (the n-strong order property)(where n ≥ 3).
6) T has the NSOP2.
7) T has the NSOP1.
Proof. Only 5) is not immediate.
It suffices to show
(∗) T has NSOPn iff for some ϕ = ϕ(x¯, y¯) we have
(∗)ϕ there is an indiscernible set 〈a¯ℓ : ℓ < ω〉 such that
(a) for every 0 = i0 < . . . < in = ω, {ϕ(x¯, a¯m)
if(ℓ even) : ℓ < n,m ∈
[iℓ, iℓ+1)} is consistent
(b) for no i0 < . . . < in do we have |= (∃x¯)
∧
ℓ≤n
ϕ(x¯, a¯iℓ)
if(ℓ even)
5.19
In this context, there are naturally the most complex theories:
5.20 Definition. 1)We say that ϕ(x¯, y¯) straightly maximal (in T ) if Γϕ is maximal.
2) We say ϕ(x¯, y¯, z¯) is strongly straightly maximal (in T ) if ΓT,ϕ(x¯,y¯,z¯) is maxi-
mal. 3) Call T straightly maximal if some ϕ(x¯, y¯) is.
4) Call T strongly straightly maximal if some ϕ(x¯, y¯, z¯) is.
36 SAHARON SHELAH
An example is true arithmetic, i.e. Th(ω, 0, 1,+,×)
5.21 Problem: 1) Develop a theory
(a) for non-straightly maximal T
(b) for non-strongly straightly maximal.
2) Find natural nonstructure theorem, i.e. witness for having complicated models
(a) for straightly maximal T ’s
(b) for strongly straightly maximal T ’s.
∗ ∗ ∗
Now 5.21 seems quite persuasive to me, but I have to say I do not know of a
test problem, nor what should we expect of a good theory for the nonmaximal
theory. Note that this scheme does not include the (k, n)− ∗-NIP where “arity” is
important.
We can easily adapt the definitions to include it, but the present version is not
necessarily a drawback - the present version does not discriminate elements from
seven-tuples, etc., and
5.22 Thesis: It is certainly reasonable to map the continents and oceans before we
look at hills and lakes (if we can, of course).
Now superstability does not fit this scheme, too, again it is a finer distinction;
yet, we write down this version.
5.23 Definition. Fix T and C = CT and α an ordinal.
1) Let ϕ¯ = 〈ϕi(x¯, y¯i, c¯i) : i < α〉 be a sequence with c¯i from CT .
For n < ω and a¯i,ℓ ∈ (ℓg(y¯i))C let
uϕ¯(〈a¯i,ℓ : i < α, 0 < n〉) =
{
u ⊆ α× n : the type {ϕ(x¯, a¯i,ℓ)
if((i,ℓ)∈u) :
i < α, ℓ < n} is consistent
}
.
2) For a sequence ϕ¯ = 〈ϕi(x¯, y¯i, c¯i) : i < α〉 as above let
Γϕ¯ =
{
(n,u) :for some n and a¯i,ℓ ∈
(ℓg(y¯i)C
(for i < α, ℓ < n) we have
uϕ¯(〈a¯i,ℓ : i < α, ℓ < n〉) = u
}
.
3) Let ΓαT = {Γϕ¯ : ϕ¯ = 〈ϕi(x¯, y¯i) : i < α〉}.
4) Let Γ∗2 = {(n, F1, F2) : n < ω and F1, F2 are disjoint families of partial finite
functions from α× n to {true,false}}.
5) We say that 〈a¯i,ℓ : i < α, ℓ < n〉 does ϕ¯-realizes (n, F1, F2) ∈ Γ
∗
α if is as above
and:
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(∗)1 f ∈ F1 ⇒ C |= (∃x¯)[
∧
(i,ℓ)∈ Dom(f)
ϕi(x¯, a¯i,ℓ)
f(i,ℓ)]
(∗)2 f ∈ F2 ⇒ C |= ¬(∃x¯)[
∧
(i,ℓ)∈ Dom(f)
ϕi(x¯, a¯i,ℓ)
f(i,ℓ)].
6) For Γ ⊆ Γ∗ we say that ϕ¯ = 〈ϕi(x¯, y¯i, c¯i)〉 has the Γ-property in T if every
(n, F1, F1) ∈ Γ is ϕ¯-realized for T .
7) We say that T has the Γ-property for Γ ⊆ Γ∗α if some ϕ¯ = 〈ϕi(x¯, y¯i) : i < α〉 has
the Γ-property.
What about DOP, OTOP, etc?
5.24 Definition. For a logic L , (T,L ) has any of the properties defined above if
we allow the formulas ϕ to be in L but as L possibly fail compactness we should
like large case so:
(a) (T,L ) has the order property if for some ϕ(x¯, y¯) ∈ L with γ =: ℓg(x¯) =
ℓg(y¯), for every linear order I there are a model M of T and a¯t ∈ γM for
t ∈ I such that, for any t, s ∈ I we have M |= ϕ[a¯t, a¯s] iff t <I s
(b) (T,L ) has the independence property if for some ϕ(x¯, y¯) ∈ L , for every λ
there are a model M of T, a¯γ ∈ ℓg(y¯)M for γ < λ, a¯u ∈ ℓg(x¯)M for u ⊆ λ
such that M |= ϕ[a¯u, b¯γ ] iff γ ∈ u.
But if we look at NDOP or NOTOP, (for superstable T , in the standard defini-
tion) we do not fully use L = L|T |T ,|T |∗ or L = L|T |+,ℵ0 ,L = L|T |+,ℵ0(Q
dim≥ℵ1)
(if we use finite sequences, sufficient for superstable T , see [Sh:c, Ch.XII]) or
L = L|T |+,|T |+ , we rather use formulas of specific form. But the order prop-
erty and independence property becomes equivalent, and main gap tend to show
equivalence of such versions.
∗ ∗ ∗
The universality spectrum raises many problems both set theoretic and model the-
oretic. For the set theoretic side, we still do not know enough on UvSp(Tord) and
also the universe UvSp for the theory of graphs (see [DjSh 659]).
5.25 Problem: Is it consistent that for some λ, λ, µ, λ < µ < 2λ and µ ∈ UvSp(T )
for every countable T ? (equivalently true arithmetic).
Still theories with SOP4 look essentially maximal (as the results on linear orders
hold for them)
5.26 Problem: Does every NSOP4 theory T have consistently a non-trivial univer-
sality spectrum?
5.27 Thesis: The way, (a good way), a reasonable way to develop the theory of
NSOP4 and/or NSOP4 first order theories is
(∗) start by asking which first order theories fall under the persuasion of [Sh
457, §4]?
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So we know that if T has SOP4 then not, whereas if T is simple, then yes. Lastly,
for some T which has SOP3 & NSOP4, the answer is yes.
The nice scenario is if those will be exactly SOP4. If this succeeds, this will be very
good for investigating universality spectrum. It may give something on the theory
of NSOP4. Maybe, a right parallel of non-forking. If it fails, it still gives important
information on universality. May give information on NSOP3.
5.28 Discussion: One may pose the question: is universality just a tool toward
classifying?
Answer: In some sense, yes.
But, I believe the right way to classify is to choose a worthwhile relevant test
problem (like number of non-isomorphic models). So it is true that in a sense the
classification is higher, real aim but still the universality spectrum and classifying
I(λ, T ) are very important. Reason for optimism concerning the universality spec-
trum is: the positive and negative answers (guessing clubs) and [Sh 457, §4] seems
to speak on the same thing.
5.29 Question: CON(in λ+ there is universal linear order & 2λ > λ+ & λ =
λ>λ > ℵ0). If this fails, we can look at the examples in [Sh 500, §2] (existentially
complete directed graph with no (≤ k)-cycle).
Of course: we would like to ask for which first order theories the proof in [Sh 457],
[DjSh 614] will work?
For PA (piano arithmetic)? Conceivably for PA we can prove that: there is no
universal in more cardinalities than the obvious ones (λ = 2<λ, where λ > |T | for
simplicity) or can try there all theories. If we fail for linear order but succeed for
some other T ’s, it should be very illuminating, maybe revealing new dividing lines.
I have not looked at
5.30 Question: Does all simple unstable countable theories have the same univer-
sality spectrum? Or, do they have many possible spectrums?
The natural way: look at forcing for graphs and think of a non-trivial simple
theory such that if in the beginning we force many models of it in χ, there would
not be co-habitation.
If we discover too fine a distinction, it will not be so exciting to investigate.
Even so, a Major question is
5.31 Problem: Find the maximal class for UnSp, that is a dividing line in the sense
that they behave like linear order (at present).
If for all first order T we have the consistency hoped for linear order, but many such
theories behave differently and there is no alternate proofs for “there is no universal”
in ZFC (+ cardinal arithmetic), then finer distinction among such theories look not
inviting.
My feeling: the dividing line of the proof in [Sh 500, §2] is a major dividing line,
the one for universality.
To get semi-ZFC distinction
5.32 Question: Generalize [Sh 457] to λ++.
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Clearly for NSOP4 theories and probably more this fails; i.e. we get some notion
but the property required in [Sh 457] fails; but this may provide a theory of types
to NSOP4 theory (or a new dividing line).
Of course, we may like to know more on simple theories
5.33 Problem: For which theories the consistency results on graphs ([Sh 175], [Sh
175a], [DjSh 659]?) can be generalized?
Even for graphs (but probably not hard):
5.34 Problem: Can we in [Sh 175a] get the consistency for all regular cardinals in
the intervals? also for the singulars?
∗ ∗ ∗
5.35 Discussion: In the spectrum from in the one end finding the bare outlines,
finding some order in the total chaos, to the other end, perfectly understanding on
what we know not little, I prefer the first. So though I was (and am still) sure that
there is much more to be said on superstable/stable theories (in fact, this essentially
follows from the belief that it is an important dividing line) not to say on theories
of finite Morley rank, and on simple theories, I am more excited from starting new
frameworks.
Of course, I believe that such general theorems of f.o. theories will have mean-
ingful application for specific theories (though I do not agree with A. Robinson
that this is the aim of model theory or a needed justification; but I agree it is a
worthwhile one), in fact, such applicability is highly suggestive from belief in the
meaningfulness of the dividing line (if the theory is serious). Well, some may argue
that has not simple theories proved to be the only one with reasonable non-forking
(by Kim and Pillay [KiPi])? Yes, but this had been done for stable, too, and maybe
trying to generalize is not the only way to find an understanding of such theories.
For example, probably the theory of NSOP3 theories will replace elements by for-
mulas, and we shall have to make parallel replacement moving from NSOPn to
NSOPn+1. E.g. consider: for a formula ϕ(x¯, a¯) in M1 and M0 ≺ M1 and type
p ∈ S(M1) to which ϕ(x, a¯) belongs, as in 5.8 q ⊆ p ↾ M0, |q| ≤ |T |, ϕ(x, a¯) reflect
nicely in M0. However, in some sense having proved the main gap for countable
f.o. theory, I feel my task (on first order theories) was done, just like [Sh 460] in
cardinal arithmetic.
∗ ∗ ∗
In linear order, if 〈at : t ∈ J〉 is indiscernible (≡ monotonic) over A, t0 < s < t1
and {t0, s, t1} ⊆ J , then tp(as, {at0 , at1}) ⊢ tp(as, A).
5.36 Question: Can we prove a similar phenomena for NIP theories?
This cannot be literally true as for stable theories it is false. Probably we should
“divide” the works between stable like parts and the above idea.
On the other hand putting together intervals of length |T | and adding we can find
〈b′t : t ∈ I〉 such that b¯t ⊆ b¯
′
t and for t0 < t1 < t2, tp(b¯t1 , b¯
′
t0
ˆb¯′t2) ⊢ tp(b¯t1 ,∪{b¯s :
s /∈ (t0, t2)}.
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In some sense, a model of a stable theoryM can be represented by a well ordering
and unary functions:
5.37 Fact: If Th(M) is stable and |M | = {aα : α < α∗}, we can find fϕ,ℓ : α∗ → α∗
satisfying fϕ,ℓ(α) < Max{2, α} (for ϕ = ϕ(x, y¯) ∈ L(τT ), ℓ < nϕ < ω) such that
tp(〈aα1 , . . . , aαn〉, ∅,M) can be reconstructed from equalities between composition
of fϕ,ℓ (the point being that tpϕ(aα, {aβ : β < α}) is definable by some ψ(y¯, c¯), c¯ ⊆
{aβ : β < α}).
5.38 Problem: 1) For NIP theories, does something parallel hold with equalities
replace by some (≤ |T |) linear orderings of α∗?
2) Find parallel theories for other properties of T .
5.39 Problem: Investigate first order T which are NIP (i.e. without the indepen-
dence property).
5.40 Question: For T with NIP:
1) If A ⊆ B ⊆ CT , p ∈ S(A), does there exist q ∈ S(B) extending p which does not
fork over A?
2) Do ordered groups play here a role similar to groups for stable theories?
5.41 Question: For (complete) T with the independence property, T1 ⊇ T , and θ
and for simplicity λ a successor of regular > 2θ, are there θ-resplened models M1
of T1 with M1 ↾ τT has large L∞,λ-Karp height?
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§6 Classifying non-elementary classes
I see this as the major problem of model theory. Cherlin presses me to expand
on this point; now in ’69 Morley and Keisler told me that model theory of first
order logic is essentially done and the future is the development of model theory
of infinitary logics (particularly fragments of Lω1,ω). By the eighties it was clearly
not the case and attention was withdrawn from infinitary logic (and generalized
quantifiers, etc.) back to first order logic. Now, of course, it is better to prove
theorems in a wider context, also we may recall that algebraists are not restricting
their attention to elementary classes; but wider context may have a heavy price
in content, it is not clear that there interesting theory left at all. As the theory
for the family of first order theories has widened and deepened this attention was
justified. But, of course, it would be wonderful if we have at all a classification
theory for nonelementary classes. Just generalizing with changes here and there is
not so exciting, but clearly, if there is a theory at all, there are in it many dividing
lines of different character; the danger it is the other direction: having too weak
theory.
Of course , this is phrased too generally, e.g. I feel classes defined by ψ ∈ Lℵ1,ℵ1
are probably hopeless (we can easily code behaviour which are very set theoretically
sensitive). So “non elementary” should be restricted to a reasonable class, and there
are choices. The first case I considered was (KD,≺) where
6.1 Definition. Let T be a first order complete theory, D ⊆ D(T ) = ∪{D(M) :M
a model of T } where D(M) = {tp(a¯, ∅,M) : a¯ ∈ mM,m < ω}, (so D codes T , well
when D 6= ∅). Let
1) KD = {M :M a model of T (so τ(M) = τ(T )) and moreover D(M) ⊆ D} (and
≺ is the usual being elementary submodel order).
2) M is λ-sequence-homogeneous (or just λ-homogeneous) if for every elementary
map f of M (i.e. f one to one from Dom(f) ⊆M to Rang(f) ⊆M and f preserve
first order formulas) of cardinality < λ and a ∈ M there is an elementary map f ′
of M satisfying f ⊆ f ′ & a ∈ Dom(f ′).
3) M is (λ,D)-homogeneous if M is λ-homogeneous and D(M) = D.
The reason for considering KD was that “(λ,D)-homogeneous” was similar to “λ-
saturated”. The older notion of model homogenous had not looked managable to
me (see 6.2(1),(2) below).
6.2 Definition. 1) M is λ-model-homogeneous if: for every isomorphism f from
M1 ≺ M onto M2 ≺ M,M1 ≺ N1 ≺ M, ‖N1‖ < λ there is N2,M2 ≺ N2 ≺ M and
an isomorphism f ′ from N1 onto N2 extending f .
2) M is model homogenous if it is ‖M‖-model homogeneous.
3) Dκ(M) = {N/ ∼=: N ≺M, ‖N‖ ≤ κ}.
4)M is (λ,D)-homogeneous ifM is λ-model homogeneous and D|τ(D)|+ℵ0(M) = D .
5) KD = {M : D|τ(D)|+ℵ0(M) ⊆ D}.
Still we do not know the answer to
6.3 Question: 1) Is there a “reasonable” upper bound to
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µ∗κ =
{
Min{λ :there is no (λ,D)-homogeneous model of cardinality
λ} : for some complete first order theory T of cardinality κ,
D ⊆ D(T )
}
.
2) Similarly for (λ,D)-homogeneity.
I think that it is known (by the Kazachstan school, under GCH) that µ∗ℵ0 ≥ ℵω.
But more central for me is
6.4 Problem: 1) How much of the theory on stable theories can be generalized to
(KD,≺) for stable D?
2) Similarly for superstable; where
6.5 Definition. 1) KD is stable if (for every λ there is a (λ,D)-homogeneous
model of cardinality ≥ λ, and) for arbitrarily large λ,KD is stable in λ which
means A ⊆ M ∈ KD, |A| = λ⇒ S(A,M) = {tp(a,A,M) : a ∈ M} has cardinality
≤ λ.
2) KD is superstable if the stability holds for every large enough λ.
Investigation of (KD,≺) have been carried, see the introduction of [HySh 676].
There is little on (λ,D)-homogeneity (see [Sh 237c], [Sh 300]). The interest is
mainly in D such that for every λ there is (λ,D)-homogeneous model of cardinality
λ, but anyhow in definition 6.5, it suffices to deal with “small λ”, the rest follows.
6.6 Problem: 1) Prove the main gap for
I(λ,KD) = {M/ ∼=:M ∈ KD, ‖M‖ = λ}.
2) Prove the main gap for
I(λ, {M ∈ KD :M is (κ,D)-homogeneous}) = |{M/ ∼=:M ∈ KD has cardinality λ
and is (κ,D)-homogeneous}|.
Certainly for first order classes I considered as the main case version (1) (note:
when D = D(T ) we get back the elementary classes as special cases). However,
here the interest started with (D,µ)-homogeneous model so probably part (2) is
more natural. However, the problem has not been resolved even for countable first
order T,D = D(T ); see [HySh 676, §0] on what was done.
What is lost in this context compared with the first order one? Formulas are not
so interesting any more, except as part of a complete type. There is a remnant
of compactness: there is a ∈ CD realizing a type p ∈ S(A) iff for every finite B
the type p ↾ B is realized. Also the Hanf numbers of omitting types is helpful and
(D,κ)-homogeneous is quite parallel to κ-saturated; large parts of stability theory
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for such models has been generalized to this context and much more is still to be
done. Note that it should not all be parallel to the first order case, first there are
new aspects (like λ-goodness), also some early work was done first in this context
(the stability spectrum κ(D) and λ(D)) and lastly, something like Ceq may be better
here in some respects.
Another direction has been universal class, where a class K of τ -models closed
under isomorphism is a universal class when M ∈ K iff every finitely generated
submodel belongs to K (see [Sh 300], [Sh:h]). This context is incomparable with
first order; a universal class is certainly not necessarily first order, and also the
inverse implication fails. Now there may be long sequences on which a quantifier
free formula defines order, in which case we have a strong nonstructure. Otherwise
we can define being a submodelM ≤ N , axiomatize the setting and start developing
the parallel of [Sh:c], with types being defined by chasing arrows rather than as a set
of formulas, starting with the parallel of the theorem “saturated ≡ homogeneous
universal”, and having some new dividing lines, getting regular types, etc. The
idea was that assuming some possible reasons for strong nonstructure does not
hold, we can define a stronger notion of submodel <1 (like ≺Σ1) and prove that
K+ = (K, <1) is inside our setting. We think that after enough such strengthening,
the intersection is similar enough to the first order case to prove the main gap, but
this was not done.
6.7 Question: Does the main gap (of course with depth possibly quite large) hold
for universal classes?
Note that though first order formulas does not play a role, types, dimension of
indiscernible sets, prime models, orthogonality and regularity does. Also we believe
that the idea of changing inductively the context will be helpful (as it is in [Sh 600]).
We may rather look at classes defined say by ψ ∈ Lω1,ω, here it is harder to
begin.
Note that generally in this section I have thought that we should expect not just
the situation in cardinals λ ≤ |T | to be different than in “large enough λ” (as was
the case for first order) but say λ < relevant Hanf number of Lω1,ω, so the small
cardinal should have different behaviour. The theory is not totally empty as we
can prove some things:
6.8 Theorem. Assume 2ℵn < 2ℵn+1 for n < ω.
1) If ψ ∈ Lω1,ω have “few” models in ℵ1, . . . ,ℵn (essentially I(ℵm, ψ) < 2
ℵm) but
has an uncountable model then ψ has a model in ℵn+1.
2) If ψ ∈ Lω1,ω have few models in ℵ1,ℵ2, . . . ,ℵn, . . . (n < ω) but has an uncountable
model, then ψ has models on all cardinalities.
3) If ψ ∈ Lω1,ω is categorical in ℵ1,ℵ2, . . . ,ℵn, . . . , (n < ω), then ψ is categorical
in every λ > ℵ0; in fact under the assumption of part (2), ψ is excellent, and for
excellent classes categoricity is one λ > ℵ0 suffice here (essentially [Sh 87a], [Sh
87b] when “few” is strengthened a little, see more in [Sh 600], more on excellent
class [GrHa89]).
We do not know:
6.9 Problem: If ψ ∈ Lω1,ω (or even ψ ∈ Lκ+,ω) is categorical in one λ ≥ iω1 (or
λ ≥ i(2κ)+), then ψ is categorical in every such λ?
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Some wonder why “λ ≥ iω1”? Now λ ≥ ℵω is necessarily as by [HaSh 323], ψ may
categorical in ℵ0, . . . ,ℵn, but not in λ if 2ℵn < 2λ (or so).
Others wonder why such modest question, isn’t the main gap better? Of course
it is, but I think it is more reasonable first to resolve the categoricity. But are “a
class of models of ψ ∈ Lκ+,ω” the best context? Thinking of putting [Sh 87a] +
[Sh 87b] together with results on Lω1,ω(Q) in [Sh 48], I consider ([Sh 88]) abstract
elementary classes. I have preferred this context, certainly the widest I think has
any chance at all.
In [Sh 87a], [Sh 87b], [Sh 88] it is proved:
(∗)2 catgoricity (of ψ ∈ Lω1,ω(Q)) in ℵ1 implies the existence of a model of ψ of
cardinality ℵ2;
(∗)3 if n > 0, 2ℵ0 < 2ℵ1 < . . . < 2ℵn , ψ ∈ Lω1,ω and 1 ≤ I(ℵℓ, ψ) < µwd(ℵℓ) for
1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n, then ψ has a model of cardinality ℵn+1
(∗)4 if 2ℵ0 < 2ℵ1 < . . . , ψ ∈ Lω1,ω and 1 ≤ (ℵℓ, ψ) < µwd(ℵℓ) for ℓ = 1, 2, . . . ,
then ψ has a model in every infinite cardinal and is categorical in one λ > ℵ0
iff it is categorical in every λ > ℵ0.
Now the problems were:
6.10 Problem: Prove (∗)3, (∗)4 in the context of an abstract elementary class K
which is PCℵ0 .
6.11 Problem: Parallel results in ZFC; e.g. prove (∗)3 when n = 1, 2ℵ0 = 2ℵ1 . By
[Sh 88, §6] there are classes categorical in ℵ1 if MA, but not so if 2
ℵ0 < 2ℵ1 so really
there is here a different model theory involved.
6.12 Problem: Construct examples; e.g. K (or ψ ∈ Lω1,ω), categorical in ℵ0,ℵ1, . . . ,ℵn
but not in ℵn+1 (see [HaSh 323]).
6.13 Problem: If K is λ-a.e.c. (abstract elementary class), and is categorical in λ
and λ+, does it necessarily have a model in λ++? assuming 2λ < 2λ
+
< 2λ
++
? In
[Sh 576] we solve a somewhat weaker version of 6.13.
It is reasonable to be willing to assume large cardinal, if we can develop some
interesting theory. In [MaSh 285] a version of Los Conjecture for T ⊆ Lκ,ω, κ
compact cardinal was proved (starting for large enough successor).
6.14 Question: 1) If T ⊆ Lκ+,ω is categorical in one limit λ > i(2κ+|T |)+ , then T is
categorical in every λ ≥ i(2κ+|T |)+ .
2) Similarly for K a κ-a.e.c. with amalgamation.
3) Similarly for K as κ-a.e.c.
Note: that for (2) there are some results ([Sh 394]).
Moreover
6.15 Problem: 1) Develop classification (or at least stability) theory for T ⊆ Lκ,ω
at least if κ is compact, or even just measurable.
In Kolman Shelah [KlSh 362], [Sh 472] the parallel (downward part) is proved for
κ-measurable.
RUTGERS SEMINARS 1997 45
Several cases lead to
6.16 Problem: Classify Φ proper for linear order (more accurately (Φ, τ), τ ⊆ τ(Φ))
according to the function I(λ,KΦ,τ ) where
KΦ,τ = {EMτ (I,Φ) : I a linear order of cardinality λ}.
Probably as a first step we should consider generic I ⊆ (λ2, <lex) of cardinality λ
(and then try to work in ZFC). Maybe it is reasonable to restrict ourselves to a
dense family of Φ’s, see [Sh 394].
6.17 Problem: More interesting classes to serve as index models. We have consid-
ered linear orders, trees with κ + 1 levels, ordered graphs (see [Sh:e, Ch.III,end of
§2], [LwSh 560]).
If T ⊆ Lκ,ω, κ compact have compactness for Lκ,κ-types and can prove (under
categoricity or a failure of a nonstructure assumption) that ≺Lκ,ω=≺Lκ,κ . But when
we consider e.g. κ-a.e.c. with amalgamation, we may have a formal description of
a type p ∈ S(M) having p ↾ N wherever N ≤K M has small cardinality, neither
knowing it there a ≤K-extension of M in which it is realized; not knowing it is
unique. Remember the type was defined by chasing ≤K-embedding.
In [Sh 576] we consider whether we can do anything without any remnant of
compactness (i.e. without E.M.-models, no large cardinals, no omitting type theo-
rems) with some success. This is continued in [Sh 600], where we look at an abstract
version of superstability (proved to occur in “nature” relying on earlier work.
∗ ∗ ∗
There may be, however, limitations. First order logic was characterized e.g. by
Lowenheim Skolem to ℵ1+ compactness, now those are the first step, and we may
well have the parallel of the theory without having the basic properties (Lowenheim
Skolem and compactness).
6.18 Problem Can we characterize what part of stability theory are actually peculiar
to first order?
We may consider generalizing the definitions and theorems on simple theories
(see §5 particularly 5.4, 5.5). Now the context which seems less hostile is (D,λ)-
homogeneous one (see the beginning of the section).
6.19 Definition. Assume D is a finite diagram.
1) Let κθ,σ(D) be the first regular (for simplicity) cardinal κ such that there is no
increasing continuous sequence 〈Ai : i ≤ κ〉 of D-sets each of cardinality < κ + θ
and p ∈ SmD (Aκ) such that for every i < κ, p ↾ Ai+1 does (θ, σ)-divide over Ai (see
below).
2) We say that p ∈ SD(B) does (θ, σ)-divide over A if:
(A ⊆ B are D-sets and in some D-set C ⊇ B)
there are b¯ ∈ θ>B and sequence 〈b¯t : t ∈ I〉 in which
b¯ appears, as b¯t∗ , |I| = σ,C = B ∪
⋃
t
b¯t and there are no
D-set C1 ⊇ C and d¯ ∈ m(C1) such that:
(∗) letting γ = ℓg(b¯) and q(x, y¯) ∈ S1+γ(B) be {ϕ(x, y¯, c¯) : c¯ ⊆ B,ϕ(x, b¯, c¯) ∈ p}
we have: d¯ realizes q(x, b¯t) for at least two t ∈ I.
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3) If we omit σ from (1) we mean i((2θ+κ+(τ(D)))+) and in (2) we mean i((2|B|+(τ(D)))+).
The value of |I| is to allow us to use the Hanf number for omitting type, no point
to increase further.
Of course
6.20 Claim. 1) If p ∈ SD(B) does θ-divide over A, then p does θ-divide
+ over A
which means that we can choose 〈b¯t : t ∈ I〉 to be an indiscernible sequence.
2) If p ∈ SD(B) does θ-divide+ over A then for every σ, we have p ∈ SD(B) does
(θ, σ)-divide over A.
3) If κ < κθ,σ(D), µ = µ
<κ > κ+ θ,D is µ-good, then we can find a D-set A, |A| =
µ, and pi ∈ SD(Ai), Ai ⊆ A, |Ai| = κ + θ for i < µκ such that for i 6= j, pi, pj are
contradictory, i.e. no p ∈ SD(Ai ∪ Aj) extend pi and pj.
4) If κθ,σ(D) is ≥ i((2θ+σ+|τ(D)|)+) then it is ∞.
5) If κθ(D) is ≥ i((2θ+|τ(D)|)+) then it is ∞.
In Definition 6.19(2), we can demand, in (∗) instead two, a fix n < ω, we do real
change. If we ask µ ≥ ℵ0, the theorem on Hanf numbers are no longer helpful, but
weakened forms of the statement 6.20(3) holds.
We now may generalize the test problem from [Sh:93].
6.21 Theorem. Assume the axiom (Ax)µ of [Sh 80], 2
µ > λ > µ, λ<µ = λ, µ<µ =
µ.
If D is a good finite diagram and κµ,µ+(D) ≤ µ and A is a D-set of cardinality
≤ λ then we can find a (D,µ)-homogeneous model M into which A can be embedded.
However
6.22 Question: Is 〈κθ,σ(D) : θ, σ〉 characterized by few invariants? Mainly, is
〈κθ(D) : θ〉 constant for θ large enough and 〈κθ,θ+(D) : θ〉.
∗ ∗ ∗
This may be connected to the P(−)(n)-diagram theme. Looking at the proof
of Morley’s theorem, it struck me as a phenomenal good luck that categoricity
could be gotten from a global property (saturation) rather than by painstakingly
analyzing the models. A model M of cardinality λ, with vocabulary of cardinality
µ, can be represented by on an increasing continuous elementary chain 〈Mi : i < λ〉
with M =
⋃
i<λ
Mi,Mi of cardinality |i| + µ. Now for each i, we have to analyze
Mi+1 over Mi, so we represent the model 〈Mi+1,Mi〉 as an increasing continuous
elementary chain 〈(Mi+1, j,Mi,j) : j < ‖Mi+1‖〉, ‖Mi+1,j‖ = ‖Mi,j‖ = |j| + µ and
now our problem is to construct Mi+1,j+1 over Mi,j ,Mi+1,j,Mi,j+1, so we have to
represent (Mi+1,j+1,Mi+1, j,Mi,j+1,Mi,j) by an increasing continuous elementary
chain. After n such stages we have a P(n)-diaigram 〈Mu : u ∈ P(n)〉, for n = 0
this is just M , i.e. M∅ = M , and for M¯ = 〈Mu : u ∈ P(n + 1)〉 letting M¯
− =:
〈Mu : u ∈ P(n)〉 and M¯
+ =: 〈Mu∪{n−1} : u ∈ P(n)〉, both are P(n)-diagrams
and M¯− ≺ M¯+. We can say M¯ is a (λ′,P(n))-diagram if in addition ‖Mu‖ = λ
′
for u ∈ P(n).
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So to understand a model M in λ, for each n < ω and λ′ ∈ [µ, λ) for each
(λ′,P(n))-diagram 〈Mn : u ∈ P(n)〉 we have to understand Mn over M¯∗ = 〈Mu :
u ∈ P−(n)〉 where P−(n) = P(n)\{n}, M¯∗ is called a (λ′,P−(n))-diagram. So
for categoricity, “understand” means in particular that it is essentially unique up to
isomorphism (the “essentially” hint that we may have “time up to λ” to “correct”
some things). What have we gained? Just naturally we can prove statements by
induction on λ′: a statement on P(−)(n)-diagrams for all n simultaneously (or for
λ = µ+n, prove for (µ+m,P(n−m))!) The gain is that the statement for (λ′,P(n))
for λ′ > µ naturally used λ′′ ∈ [µ, λ′) and P(n+ 1).
To prove existence of a model in λ, we similarly prove by induction on λ′ ∈ [µ, λ)
that a (λ′,P−(n))-diagram can be completed to a (λ′,P(n))-diagram.
Of course, we expect more conditions, complicating our induction.
6.23 Thesis: For complicated problems (on say all cardinals) we expect we need
such a P−(n) analysis.
This scheme was used in [Sh 87b] mentioned above, and also [SgSh 217], [Sh:c,
Ch.XII], [Sh 234]. Returning to simple finite diagrams, for proving goodness from
good behaviour in small cardinals, etc., this seems reasonable. This also applies to
the hopeful Prn for 5.6.
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§7 Finite model theory
0-1 Laws
Many were interested but hope is faint.
7.1 Problem: Find a logic with 0-1 law (or at least convergence or at least with
very weak 0-1 law) from which finite combinatorialist can draw conclusion, novel
for them.
But see [Fri99]. We know that say for the random model (n,<,R),R a random
2-place relation, the 0-1 law and even convergence fails ([CHSh 245]) but the very
weak 0-1 law holds ([Sh 551], a continuation with accurate estimates Boppana
Spencer [BoSp]). However, this positive result goes through without telling us
what first order formulas can define (in any random enough such model).
7.2 Question: Find the model theoretic content of the very weak 0-1 laws for
(n,<,R) and (n,F ),F a random 2-place function.
We hope for a very weak “elimination of quantifiers”, saying hopefully one which
gives: first order formulas can say much on “small set”, but little on the majority.
Let Gn,p be the random graph with set of vertices [n] = {1, . . . , n} and edge prob-
ability p. It seems to me natural
7.3 Problem: 1) Characterize the sequences 〈pn : n < ω〉 of probabilities (that is
reals in the interval [0, 1)) such that for every first order sentence ψ in the language
of graphs we have
Possibility a: (0− 1 law):
〈Prob(Gn,pn |= ψ) : n < ω〉 converge to zero or converge to 1.
Possibility b: (convergence):
〈Prob(Gn,pn |= ψ) : n < ω〉 converge.
Possibility c: (very weak 0− 1 law):
〈Prob(Gn+1,pn+1 |= ψ)− Prob(Gn,pn |= ψ) : n < ω〉 converge to zero.
2) Like part (1) replacing Gn,pn by the Gn,p¯, the random graph with set of vertices
{1, . . . , n} and the probability of {i, j} being an edge is p(i−j) (see [LuSh 435]).
3) Other cases (say random model on {1, . . . , n} with vocabulary τ).
A solution for 7.3(2) case should be in [Sh 581].
In the cases of 0− 1 laws considered we usually get a dichotomy; say Mn is the
n-random structure, say on {1, . . . , n}; the dichotomy has the form: either (a) or
(b) where
(a) we have a complex case, i.e. we can define in Mn (if n large enough Mn
random enough) an initial segment of arithmetic of size kMn , say of order
of magnitude ∼ log(n) or at least log∗(n) (or weakly complex: k
˜
n going to
infinity or at least for some ε > 0 for every k∗, ε < lim sup Prob(kM
˜
n
≥
k∗))
(b) we have a simple case, so 0− 1 law (or at least convergence) (see [Sh 550]).
So
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7.4 Problem: 1) Prove for reasonable classes of 0-1 contexts 〈Mn : n < ω〉 such
dichotomies.
2) Investigate the family of 〈Mn : n < ω〉 which are nice (in the direction of having
0− 1 laws), like closure under relevant operations.
Concerning part (2), see [Sh 550], [Sh 637].
7.5 Problem: In §2 we discuss investigating reasonable partial orders among gener-
alized quantifiers. Make a parallel investigating on finite models.
See [Sh 639] which try to do for the finite what [Sh 171] do to a large extent for
the infinite case.
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§8 More on finite partition theorems
See discussion in [Sh 666, §8].
8.1 Question: What is the order of magnitude of the Hales-Jewitt numbers,HJ(n, c)
(see Definition 8.2(3) below).
8.2 Definition. 1) Let Λ be a finite nonempty alphabet, we define f10Λ (m, c) where
m, c ∈ N, |Λ| divide m, as the first k ≤ ω divisible by |Λ| such that:
(∗) if d is a c-colouring of [k]Λ, i.e. a function from {η : η a function from
[k] = {1, . . . , k} into a set with ≤ cmembers}, then we can find 〈Mℓ : ℓ < m〉
and η∗ such that:
(a) Mℓ ⊆ [k], ℓ 6= m⇒Mℓ ∩Mm = ∅ and η∗ is a function from M\
⋃
ℓ
Mℓ
into Λ
(b) ‖Mℓ‖ = ‖M0‖ > 0 for ℓ < m
(c) for ν1, ν2 ∈ S = {η : η ∈ [k]Λ, η∗ ⊆ η, and each η ↾ Mℓ is constant}
we have d(ν1) = d(ν2) provided that for every α ∈ Λ for i ∈ {1, 2} we
have
|{ℓ < m : νi ↾Mℓ is constantly α}| = m/|Λ|
(d) if α, β ∈ Λ and ν ∈ S then
|{a ∈M\
⋃
ℓ<m
Mℓ : η
∗(a) = α}| = |{a ∈M\
⋃
ℓ<m
Mℓ : η
∗(a) = β}|.
2) Now f9Λ(m, c) is defined similarly without clause (d).
3) HJΛ(m, c) is defined similarly omitting (d), and replacing (b), (c) by:
(b)′ Mℓ 6= ∅
(c)′ d ↾ S is constant.
Lastly let HJ(n, c) = HJ[n](1, c).
4) Let f8Λ(m, c) be defined as in part (2), replacing clause (b) by (b)
′ from part (3).
5) We define f10,∗Λ (m, c) as in part (1) replacing clause (c) by
(c)+ for ν1, ν2 ∈ S = {η : η ∈ [k]Λ, η∗ ⊆ η and each η ↾ Mℓ is constant} we have
d(ν1) = d(ν2) provided that for every α ∈ Λ we have |{ℓ < m : ν1 ↾ Mℓ is
constantly α}| = |{ℓ < m : ν2 ↾Mℓ is constantly α}|.
6) We define f9,∗Λ (m, c) as we have defined f
10,∗
Λ (m, c) omitting clause (d).
7) We define f8,∗Λ (m, c) as we have defined f
10,∗
Λ (m, c) omitting clause (d) and
replacing clause (b) by clause (b)′ from part (3).
Remark. So HJΛ(m, c) is the Hales-Jewett number for alphabet Λ, getting m-
dimensional subspace.
8.3 Fact: 1) f10Λ (m, c) ≥ f
9
Λ(m, c) ≥ f
8
Λ(m, c).
2) f10,∗Λ (m, c) ≥ f
9,∗
Λ (m, c) ≥ f
8,∗
Λ (m, c).
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3) f10Λ (m, c) ≤ f
10,∗
Λ (m, c) and f
9
Λ(m, c) ≤ f
9,∗
Λ (m, c) and f
8
Λ(m, c) ≤ f
8,∗
Λ (m, c).
4) f8,∗Λ (m, c) ≤ HJΛ(m, c).
Proof. Read the definitions.
We can deal similarly with the density (like Szemeredi theorem) version of those
functions.
May those numbers be helpful for HJ-number? First complimentarily to 8.3, clearly
8.4 Claim. HJΛ(m, c) ≤ f
8,∗
Λ (m
∗, c) if m∗ satisfies:
⊠ assume that Par = {ℓ¯ : ℓ¯ = 〈ℓα : α ∈ Λ〉, ℓα ∈ [0,m∗) and Σ{ℓα : α ∈ Λ} =
m∗} and d is a c-colouring of Par; then we can find ℓ¯α ∈ Par for α ∈ Λ
such that d ↾ {ℓ¯α : α ∈ Λ} is constant and for some ℓ∗ > 0 and 〈ℓ∗α : α ∈ Λ〉
we have for any distinct α, β ∈ Λ : ℓαβ = ℓ
∗
β , ℓ
α
α = ℓ
∗
α + ℓ
∗.
Remark. We can choose α∗ ∈ Λ let Λ∗ = Λ\{α∗} and restrict ourselves to Par′ =
{ℓ¯ ∈ Par : α ∈ Λ∗ ⇒ ℓα ≤ m
∗∗ =: m∗/|Λ|} and let Par′′ = {ℓ¯ ↾ Λ∗ : ℓ¯ ∈ Par′},
now Par′′ = Λ[0,m∗∗), and ℓ¯ 7→ ℓ¯ ↾ Λ∗ is a one-to-one map from Par′ onto Par′′.
So clearly it suffices to find a d-monocromatic {ℓ¯∗} ∪ {ℓ¯α : α ∈ Λ∗} ⊆ Par′′ and
m > 0 such that ℓαβ = ℓ
∗
β if β 6= α ∈ Λ
∗, ℓαβ = ℓ
∗
α+m if β = α ∈ Λ
∗. Now this holds
by ⊠ which is a case of the |Λ∗|-dimensional of v.d.W. 8.4
8.5 Claim. 1) f10Λ (m, c) ≤ m×HJ(|Λ|
m, c) so f10Λ is not far from the Hales Jewett
numbers.
2) f9,∗Γ (m, c) ≤ m×HJ(|Γ|
m, c).
Proof. 1) Let Mk be {0, . . . , k − 1}.
Let Λ1 be the set of function π from {0, . . . ,m − 1} to Λ such that α ∈ Λ ⇒
|π−1{α}| = m/|Λ|.
Let n1 = |Λ1| so n1 ≤ |Λ|m and k1 = HJ(|Λ|m, c) and k = m× k1.
Let d be a c-colouring of V = Λ(Mk). Let V1 =
Λ1(Mk1) and we define a function
g from V1 onto V as follows:
for η ∈ V1, we have to define 〈g(η)(a) : a ∈ Mk〉, g(η)(a) ∈ Λ, now for a ∈
{0, . . . , k−1} notingm[a/m] ≤ a < m[a/m]+mwe define g(η)(a) = (η([a/m]))([a/m]−
m[a/m]).
We define a c-colouring d1 of V1: d1(η) = d(g(η)). So there is nonempty N ⊆M and
ρ∗1 a function from M\N into Λ1 such that d1 ↾ {ρ ∈
Λ1(Mk1) : ρ
∗
1 ⊆ ρ and ρ ↾ N is
constant} is constant. Let for ℓ < m,Nℓ = {a : [a/m] ∈ N and [a/m]−m[a/m] = ℓ}
and ρ∗ ∈ Λ(Mk\
⋃
ℓ<m
Nℓ) be such that ρ
∗ ⊆ ρ ∈ Λ(Mk)⇒ ρ∗1 ⊆ g(ρ). Now check.
2) Similar proof. 8.5
8.6 Question: 1) Can we give better bounds to f ℓΛ(m, c) than through HJ for
ℓ = 8, 9, 10?
2) What is the order of magnitude of f8, f9, f10?
3) What about f11 (see 8.11 below) and f10,∗, f9,∗, f8,∗?
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8.7 Definition. 1) For a set A let
(a) seqℓ(A) = {η : η is a sequence of length ℓ with no repetitions, of
elements of A}
(b) seq(A) =
⋃
ℓ≥1
seqℓ(A)
(c) seqm,ℓ(A) = {η¯ : η¯ = 〈ηi : i < m〉, ηi ∈ seqℓ(A) and i1 < i2 ⇒ Rang(ηi1 ) ∩
Rang(ηi2) = ∅
(d) seq∗m(A) = ∪{seqm,ℓ(A) : ℓ ≥ 1}
(e) seq∗(A) = ∪{seq∗m(A) : m ≥ 1}.
2) For η¯ ∈ seq∗(A) let
son(η¯) = {ν : ν ∈ seq(A) and ν is a concatenation of some members of
{ηℓ : ℓ < ℓg(η¯)}, in any order}
legson(η¯) = {ν ∈ son(η¯) : Rang(ν) =
⋃
i
Rang(ηi)},
dis(η¯) = {ν¯ ∈ seq∗(A) : each νi is from son(η¯)},
leg dis(η¯) = {ν¯ ∈ dis(η¯) :
⋃
i
Rang(νi) =
⋃
i
Rang(ηi)}.
3) f12(m, c) is the first k such that k = ω or k < ω and for every c-colouring d of
seq([0, k)) there is η¯ ∈ seq∗m(A) such that the set son(η¯) is d-monocromatic.
There are other variants.
8.8 Question: Is f12(m, c) finite?
8.9 Definition. 1) For groups G,H and subset Y of H and cardinal κ let G →
(Y,H)κ means that for any κ-colouring d of G (i.e. d is a function from G into a set
of cardinality ≤ κ) there is an embedding h ofH into G such that d ↾ {h(y) : y ∈ Y }
is constant.
2) G → (Y,H)κ,θ is defined similarly but d ↾ {h(y) : y ∈ Y } has range with < θ
members.
3) If Y = H we may omit it.
8.10 Question: 1) Investigate G→ (Y,H)c for finite groups.
2) Assume H is a finite permutation group, Y is one conjugacy class (say permuta-
tion of order two) and c finite, does G→ (Y,H)c exist? (This is connected to 8.7,
just interpret η ∈ seq(A) of even legnth 2n with the permutation of A permuting
η(i) with η(n+ 1) for i < n.
3) Similarly when we colour subgroups of G.
Similar problems to 8.6 are
8.11 Definition. 1) (See [Sh 679] and the notation there). Let f1
Λ¯
(m, c) is the first
k such that k = ω (i.e. infinity) or
(∗)k k is divisible by |Λid| and letting M = M τk , we have: for every c-colouring
d of SpaceΛ¯(M), we can find an m-dimensional subspace S such that
(a) letting 〈Mℓ : ℓ < m〉 be a witness for S (see Definition [Sh 679, 1.7t(5)]
the dimension of Mℓ, |PMℓ |, is the same for ℓ = 0, . . . ,m− 1
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(b) let K = Kτ[0,m), N = cℓM (
⋃
ℓ<m
Mℓ) and f as in (c) of Definition [Sh
679, 1.7t(5)]; if ρ1, ρ2 ∈ SpaceΛ¯(K) and ν1, ν2 ∈ S are such that
b ∈ N ⇒ ν1(b) = ρ1(fˆ(b)) & ν2(b) = ρ2(fˆ(b)) and there is an
automorphism of K mapping ρ1 to ρ2 then d(ν1) = d(ν2).
2) If τ = {id},Λ = Λid we write f11Λ (m, c) and above (b) means:
(b)′ for ν1, ν2 ∈ S we have d(ν1) = d(ν2) if ν1 ↾ (M\
⋃
ℓ<m
Mℓ) = ν2 ↾ (M\
⋃
ℓ<m
Mℓ)
and for every α ∈ Γ we have
|{ℓ < m : ν1 ↾Mℓ is constantly α}| = |{ℓ < m : ν2 ↾Mℓ is constantly α}|.
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